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Abstract
This thesis consists of three articles in applied economics.
In the first essay, I consider the extent to which informational frictions
between workers and jobs can be alleviated with short-term contracts in
the early career. I leverage a program at a Finnish university which gave
out randomly selected students an internship subsidy for a three-month
paid internship. I match these students to administrative data to track
their transition to labor markets in the years around the program and
find evidence that the program significantly improved early labor market
success.
In the second essay, I study the effect of social sorting on family for-
mation and inequality across households. I leverage the institutional fea-
tures of Finnish high-school assignments to evaluate how exposure to high-
skilled, high-socioeconomic -status peers affect the quality of social ties
individuals form. I find that while high schools are an important meeting
place for future spouses, but that exposure to higher quality peers will
not affect the eventual partner characteristics. This suggests that policies
aiming to mix individuals from various backgrounds may not always work
anticipated.
In the third essay, I study with two co-authors the causes and conse-
quences of broadly defined inequality and democratization using Finland
as a natural experiment. We find evidence that the 19th famine affected
inequality and labour coercion and thus the balance of political power. On
the other hand, we find that these developments were critical in explaining
both the increasing threat of revolution and participation in the Finnish
civil war in the early 20th century and a subsequent shift to democrati-
zation. Areas that initially experienced higher growth in inequality, also
experienced the most significant shift to redistribution in the aftermath
of the war.
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I study the role of internships in matching workers and jobs in the early career. I
leverage on a university-funded program which gave randomly selected students a
subsidy for a three-month internship. I match the program participants to an exten-
sive university-employer-employee dataset and study their transition to labour mar-
kets. I find that the subsidy program successfully allows students to get professional
work experience and has a positive effect on earnings growth. I then construct a direct
measure of worker-job match quality using information on students and their labour
market peers’ skills. I show that subsidized students are working in workplaces and
occupations in which their individual skills have between 5 to 10 percent higher re-
turn. These results suggest that internships provide an opportunity for students to
demonstrate their skills on-the-job, and they may significantly reduce inefficiencies in
entry-level labour markets.
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1 Introduction
Internships have become common among students aiming to enter the high skilled labour
market. For example, in the United States, more than 60 percent of college students intern
before graduation, and many graduates participate in multiple internships.1 On the one
hand, internships may increase efficiency in entry-level labour markets by diminishing
asymmetric information between employers and entering workers. Both workers and
employers may learn on-the-job about the suitability of workers to particular jobs and
tasks. On the other hand, internships are often suggested to increase job precariousness
and inequality in the early career.2 Rather than offering stepping stones to young work-
ers, employers may simply benefit from lower hiring costs and substitute full-time work-
ers with temporary, skilled labour without helping them access more stable or higher
ranked positions. Even if internship experience is associated with better labour market
outcomes among recent graduates, it may simply reflect the fact that well connected and
more skilled students are likely to get the most useful internship positions in the first
place. Indeed, so far there is relatively little credible evidence on the potential benefits of
internships on early labour market success.3
In this paper, I study whether internships help students find jobs that match their
talents in the transition to high-skilled labour markets. To make progress, I leverage an
internship subsidy program at a major Finnish university which allocates internship sub-
sidies to randomly selected students. The program provides employers a subsidy if they
hire a student for at least a 2-month paid internship. The subsidy covers about two thirds
of the minimum hiring cost. In return, the employer should allow the student to work in
expert duties under the supervision of a tenured employee and pay a minimum compen-
sation. These features make the setting appealing to understand the role of internships in
labour market transitions.
1About one half of these internships are paid and the other half unpaid (NACE 2014). While consistent
and comparable estimates on the popularity of internships do not exist (in part due to lack of common
definition of an internship) a wealth of reports from individual countries and studies on hiring practices
suggests that the institution is widespread at least in most European countries.
2See e.g., Perlin (2011).
3Survey results suggests that students who intern during their studies fare better in the early labour
markets: they are more likely to hold a job after graduation and earn a higher salary than those who did
not intern (see f.e., Taylor (1988), Gault et al. (2000) and NACE (2014)) However, since there are potentially
significant differences between the students who do internships and who do not (such as their motivation,
effort, ability, and existing labour market networks) the descriptive evidence is not sufficient for under-
standing the independent role of internships in the early career. For example, see Knouse et al. (1999) for
selection to internships among business students.
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In the first part of the empirical analysis, I take advantage of a unique administra-
tive dataset matching the program participants with student records and an extensive
full-population employer-employee dataset. This allows me to track the students labour
market transitions between occupations and employers before and after the program. I
then show that students who are assigned a subsidy are more likely to have professional
work experience and more exposure to high-skilled workplaces and jobs both during the
subsidy program year and in the following years. This suggest that the subsidy program
gives students a chance to demonstrate their skills, abilities and suitability to potential
employers in a skilled environment.
Next, I use a unique measure of individual cognitive skill based on the Finnish Ma-
triculation Exam scores to construct a direct measure of worker-job match quality. These
data are available to for full population of high-school graduates in Finland since 1967
allowing me to measure the skills of both the program participants and their colleagues
and co-workers. I measure match quality by estimating the return to individual skill-sets
across jobs and comparing them to the market return to the same individual skill-set. I
then show that subsidized students access jobs in which their individual skills have be-
tween 5 to 10 percent higher return when compared to the control group. I also find that
the subsidized students experience higher earnings growth than the control group and
that these earnings gains are concentrated on those students who had worse initial skill
mismatches in their previous jobs.
Taken together, the results suggest that intenships provide students an opportunity to
demonstrate their skills in tasks that are relevant to their later career. This opportunity
allows students to access better jobs and workplaces in which they are likely to reap ben-
efits later on. From a policy perspective, these results suggest that there is potential room
improving the matching between workers and jobs in their early career.
The study is related to a large body of literature suggesting that imperfect information
about worker productivity may generate important inefficiencies in early career labour
markets.4 In a baseline model in the literature, employers are not willing hire new work-
ers if there is a risk that, after learning about their productivity, high productivity work-
ers move to other firms. Hiring and experimenting with new workers is also constrained
by regulation on temporary and fixed-term contracts which may not allow for sufficient
4See extensive survey by Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) on investment in training programs and Terviö
(2009) for a model on the inefficiencies in hiring entry level workers. There is also extensive research in the
literature on employer learning and informational asymmetries at entry, see f.e., Farber and Gibbons (1996)
and Altonji and Pierret (2001).
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flexibility from the employers side, increasing employment risk. On the other hand, new
workers themselves may be unable to do unpaid work (or pay to be employed) to learn
about their own productivity.5 This may be due to credit constraints, laws prohibiting un-
paid work contracts or the potential negative signals and stigma that such arrangements
could cause to both parties. Social networks may alleviate these inefficiencies by allowing
new workers to signal their type, but such networks only help workers with useful exist-
ing contacts and/or credible signals of their own type. These considerations suggest that
there is potentially suboptimal level of public information on entrant productivity with
potentially long lasting effects on young workers and inefficient matching in the early
career hiring process. This gives rise to the potential benefits of public interventions to
increase the available information.
In contrast, there are only a few existing studies aiming to directly study the role of in-
ternships, or similar interventions in early career labour market outcomes for high skilled
workers.6 First, and most directly related to this study, Saniter and Siedler (2014) study
the effect of mandatory internships on labour market outcomes of students by taking ad-
vantage of introduction and abolishment of internships schemes across study programs
over time at German universities. Using post-graduation survey data, they find evidence
that internships have a positive effect on wages. Second, Nunley et al. (2016) study the
effect of internships by a resumé audit and find that fictional college graduates with past
internship experience are 14 percent more likely to be called for an interview still four
years later than non-interns. Consistent with the above employer survey evidence, this
suggest that internships are a way to signal student talent to potential employers. Third,
Cerulli-Harms (2017) uses propensity score matching and finds evidence that interns are
less likely to be employed and earn less than non-interns immediately after graduation,
but catch up in the following years. She interprets this evidence as suggesting that intern-
ship experience sends a negative signal to prospective employers. Finally, Pallais (2014)
studies the effects of providing potential employers with additional information on work-
ers past performance in an online workplace. She finds evidence that additional informa-
tion improves subsequent labour market outcomes in the entry level job market.
5Unpaid work is usually not allowed in most countries. Internships must usually be paid if employers
derive any benefit from the work done by an intern. Yet, in practice these kind of arrangements seem to
occur, potentially biasing the institution towards favouring those who can afford to work without pay.
6There exists a burgeoning empirical literature aiming to characterize the impacts of heterogeneous ac-
tive labour market programs on wages and employment, but most of these studies concentrate on unem-
ployed, disadvantaged or low-skilled workers (see Card et al. (2010)). Similarly, there exists an extensive
literature on temporary-help jobs, which are also mostly targeted to low-skilled workers.
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This study is also related to the recently emerging empirical literature on the role of
matching in the labour markets. For example, Fredriksson et al. (2015) and Guvenen
et al. (2018) show that idiosyncratic variation in worker-job match quality is a significant
predictor of worker turnover and wage growth. However, there is still little evidence on
the mechanisms through which better match quality emerges in the labour markets. I
add to this emerging literature by showing studying the role of internships in decreasing
mismatch in the early career.
This study adds to the emerging literature by providing the first analysis exploiting
an individual level experimental design and taking advantage of extensive administrative
data. In particular, the data allows to track students over time and across occupations and
workplaces, which has not been possible in previous studies.
I proceed as follows. In Section 2, I describe the internships subsidy program. In
Section 3, I describe the data and the methodology to measure worker-job match quality.
In Section 4, I present the main empirical results. In Section 5, I conclude.
2 Institutional Background
2.1 Internships and the Subsidy Program
Internships and summer jobs are very common among university students and recent
graduates in Finland and for many it provides the first opportunity to work in a pro-
fessional work environment. Student surveys suggest that 75 percent of students intern
before graduation and 25 percent do more than a single internship.7 Many private com-
panies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and public institutions offer internship
opportunities to students in various educational fields. Majority (around 60 percent) of
internships are in the public and non-profit sector. This is especially the case in the field of
social sciences where many of the students can also be expected to work after graduation
and where many of the sought-after internships exist.
Internships are also institutionally supported by Finnish universities. This happens
mainly through two important ways. One the one hand, most universities aim to promote
student attachment to labor markets by either giving academic credit to students who
intern during their studies or by including compulsory internships into study programs.
For example, in 2017, 90 percent of Finnish students could get academic credit for an
7See student survey by (Akava 2017)
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internship. On the other hand, most universities also offer direct subsidies to employers
who hire their students as paid interns. In 2017, 82 percent of students could apply for a
subsidy and about one third actually received a subsidy. This
In this paper, I concentrate on the internship subsidy program at the University of
Helsinki. The program is targeted to students typically enrolled in a 5-year master’s pro-
gram.8 With limited financing, the subsidy program is commonly oversubscribed and
participating faculties are forced to select which students to allocate the subsidies to.9
I take advantage of the fact the Faculty of Social Sciences randomized the allocation of
the subsidy between 2010 and 2013 among all the program applicants. This provides, in
effect, a randomized controlled trial. However, the program itself has been completely
administered and run by the faculty.
The internship subsidy program and the allocation procedure runs as follows. First,
in November-December, students may apply for a subsidy for an internship that starts
during the following calendar year. The subsidy amounts to around 3,000 euros, or about
two thirds of the minimum nominal compensation, including employer contributions.
Student may submit applications via a short online form on the faculty website. All en-
rolled students are eligible for the program, given that they do not already have academic
study credit for an internship, and that they have not previously received a subsidy from
the university.
In the second stage, the faculty randomly selects the students who get a subsidy
among the applicants. The randomization takes place at the discipline level so that, con-
ditional on the number of applicants, every applicant has an equal chance (about one half)
of receiving the subsidy.
Third, students who are assigned a subsidy search for an internship position in a firm,
government institution or a non-governmental organization. Typically this takes place in
early spring when internships positions for the summer are announced. Many positions
are marketed online on a university administered job openings platform where employers
may post ads targeted to students in specific educational fields. But students may also
approach any potential employer on their own. Some students may also already have a
potential employer before applying for a subsidy. However, if the student is, for whatever
8Most students applying to a study program at a Finnish university are directly admitted to both the
Bachelor’s and Master’s level degrees and courses. Most students are expected to finish with a Master’s
degree.
9Over-subscription results from the combination of fixed level of funds to run the program and a fixed
and predetermined level of the subsidy paid per student.
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reason, not able to find a job or she declines the subsidy, the subsidy is allocated to a
person in a reserve list.
Finally, if a student finds an internship position which satisfies the program require-
ments, the university reimburses the employer after the internship is completed. As per
the university rules, i) the employer needs to offer the student “expert duties that en-
able the trainee to apply and develop his or her skills to the greatest degree possible”,
ii) the employer needs to appoint a supervisor for the duration of the internship, iii) the
internship needs to last for at least two months and iv) the employer “must pay a salary
amounting to at least the minimum wage determined by the Social Insurance Institution”
(Kela), which in 2017 was 1,187 euros.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
In the empirical analysis, I use information from multiple administrative sources to track
the students transition to the labour markets. This section explains where these data come
from and how I use these data to measure the impacts of the subsidy program.
3.1 Administrative Data
Subsidy lottery First, the most important information for the empirical analysis comes
from the lottery results which list all the applicants to the subsidy program and those who
were assigned a subsidy. I obtain this information and the student id’s from the Univer-
sity of Helsinki Faculty of Social Sciences. Importantly, this data allows me to identify the
students who were initially and randomly allocated a subsidy. If a student did not take
up the subsidy, someone from the reserve list had an opportunity to use a subsidy in-
stead, creating imperfect compliance. Thus, the main empirical analysis will be based on
comparing students who were initially assigned a subsidy. However, based on aggregate
figures released by the Faculty, at least 75 percent of students initially assigned the sub-
sidy also used it. This suggests that at the minimum the difference between the control
and the treatment group subsidy takeup was 50 percentage points, or 200 percent.10
Student records Second important dataset comes from the University of Helsinki Stu-
dent Registry. In particular, I collect administrative data on the universe of students en-
10Unfortunately, I do not have the information which students actually used the subsidy or which stu-
dents in the reserve list obtained the subsidy.
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rolled at the Faculty of Social Sciences between 2007 and 2016. It includes comprehensive
information on student enrolment status and graduation dates, field of study, courses and
their instructors, grades and credits. This information is critical for the research design
as it allows me to identify the application quota through which each student applied to
the program. I can also use this information to control for student characteristics (such
as grade point average and study credits) that are likely to be important drivers of labor
market success. The data also includes information about university credited internships.
I use this information to study the impact of the subsidy on the frequency of internships.
Labor market outcomes Third, to analyze student labour market outcomes, I match
student registry data to the full population registries using anonymized students’ social
security numbers. The panel data includes information on all individuals residing in Fin-
land between 1988 and 2017, thus in effect eliminating any meaningful attrition bias. It
includes comprehensive information on annual labor earnings, employment and end-of-
year occupation codes. The data also includes a complete job history, including estab-
lishment ids as well as start and end dates for every job contract the worker has had.
The data thus provides the main individual labor market outcomes of interest as well as
measures of characteristics of workplaces (coworkers and their characteristics) as well as
occupations (other workers in the same occupation) in which the students work before,
during and after applying to the subsidy program.
Internships Fourth, I use a combination of different administrative records to measure
the frequency internships. The administrative work history data does not allow to di-
rectly discriminate whether a job is an internship as it only contains information on the
starting and end dates of the contract. Thus, to measure internships, I use two differ-
ent proxies for internship experience. On the one hand, guided by the knowledge from
student surveys, we know that a significant majority of students do internships in the
public sector. This is especially the case for students in social sciences where many of the
prestigious jobs are indeed in the public sector. This includes internships in ministries,
embassies and government research institutions, many of which typically hire a large
amount of interns. Thus, my first (and preferred) measure of internship experience is to
look at whether students were working in the public sector during the program year.
On the other hand, we have a direct measure of student internships derived from
the student registries. In particular, I take the all course records and identify credits for
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internships based on the course title using variants of the Finnish language word for
“internship” (harjoittelu). However, not all the internship credits have a title that directly
includes the word internship, and this results in measurement error and a downward bias
in the empirical estimate.11 This provides us with two alternative measures that are both
imperfect, but as I will discuss later, provide consistent results.
Skill measures Finally, I measure individual cognitive skills using the Finnish Matric-
ulation Exam Scores available from the Matriculation Exam Board. The Matriculation
Exam is a standardized examination at the end of academic high-school which, in prac-
tice, qualifies students to apply to universities.12 This allows us to match the majority
of the students in our sample to their exam grades, again using their anonymized social
security numbers.
Now, several features of the Matriculation Exam make it an appealing data source on
student’s skills for the purposes of my empirical analysis. First, students have real stakes
in the examination. Most importantly, universities and other educational institutions use
the results to select students to their study programs.13 This is in contrast to many sur-
vey based skill measures used in the empirical literature where individuals might not
have incentives to exert significant effort. Second, matriculation exams are graded in a
standardized way so that we can compare individuals across schools and over time. In
particular, all students in the country take the same exam in a given biannual examination
at the end high school. Exams are assessed by external evaluators who are appointed by
the Exam Board and who do not know the students and thus have no incentives to artifi-
cially inflate their scores. After evaluation, tests are graded on the curve so that the final
grades are in effect determined by the relative ranking within the high-school cohort.
The coverage of the data also makes it a unique and appealing source of information.
In particular, the exam scores are available for all high-school graduates since 1967. This
allows me to measure the skills of the program participants, but also of the majority of
working age, high-school educated population and practically the skills of every college
graduate in the labour markets. This is important for our proposed measure of match
quality, as will be detailed in the next section. Further, compared to other studies using
11There is also a possible upward bias in the internship credit measure as the incentives to register an
internship with the university is likely to be biased towards the subsidized internships. In the worst case,
it could be that only those who received the subsidy are willing to reger the internship. However, students
also have the incentive to register other internships as they do get study credits for them.
12Matriculation is no longer a legal requirement to apply to universities.
13Universities may also arrange their entrance examinations to complement the selection process.
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registry-based or population level datasets, the unique feature of the dataset is that it is
available for both men and women. This is important, as a significant part of the program
participants are, in fact, women.
In the empirical analysis, I concentrate on exam scores in two subjects that receive the
highest weight in most university applications: Finnish language and Mathematics. The
main benefit is that language and mathematical skills are likely to be capture complemen-
tary cognitive skills (math and verbal skills) that are rewarded in the labour markets.14
Further, while students can choose which other subjects they take a test in, Finnish lan-
guage and mathematics have been compulsory subjects for most high-school cohorts and
we observe their test scores in our dataset.
3.2 Measuring Worker-Job Matching
In this paper, my preferred measures of skill mismatch are based on a simple concenptual
framework. Suppose for simplicity that individual i has a skill set Si ∈ {sMi , sVi } where
sMi is math and s
V
i is verbal skill vector. Now, we may decompose worker i’s wage as
Yi = Siβ + εi (1)
where β is the return to skill and εi includes other potentially unobservale factors that
affect wages. Similarly, the return to skill in job j is defined as
Yi,j = Siβ j + εi,j (2)
Next, I define worker-job match quality Mi,j as the difference between market return and
return in job j
Mi,j ≡ Siβ j − Siβ (3)
The match quality thus gives a measure of how well a worker is matched to a job. A
negative match value suggest that a worker is employed in a job where the return to her
skills is lower than on average (or lower than her expected return), and a positive match
value suggests that a worker employed in a job where the return to her skills is higher
14The formats of these exams has also been fixed over time so that it is reasonable to assume that over
time the exams measure the same type of skills. Another more practical benefit of using these exams is
that up until 2005 both exams were compulsory, so that they cover most high school graduates. In 2005 it
became optional to complete the mathematics exam, but still a great majority of all students complete the
exam.
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than on average (or higher than her expected return). In this framewrok, variation in
match quality comes both from the variation in individual skill set Si as well as variation
in the return to these skills across jobs β j.
In a typical empirical setting it is hard to measure both the skill of individual work-
ers as well as the return to those skills. To make progress, I first take advantage of the
individual level cognitive skill proxies from the Matriculation Exam Scores. While cogni-
tive skills alone are not likely to capture all of the skills that are rewarded in the labour
markets, a wealth of evidence suggest that they do play an important role in determining
earnings, and their role remains especially important in professional labour markets that
are the focus of this study.15
Second, it is even more demanding to know what the differences in return to skills β j
are across different jobs. To make progress, I use information on earnings and skills from
out-of-sample workers in Finland. In particular, I estimate the market return to skills








s,g + ui (4)
where Yi is the (log) annual labour earnings, Isi is a dummy for skill s and I
s,g
i is a dummy
for having a level g skill of s, i.e., I regress the annual earnings on dummies for having a
particular grade g in exam s. Having separate dummies allows for potentially important
non-linearities in the skill return. I estimate this equation using the universe of workers
in Finland between 2010 and 2015 excluding all the students in my main main empirical
analysis.16









j + ui,j. (5)
where the sample population is the same as above, but job j is defined either by 3 digit
occupation code or an establishment id. The sample consist of all workers in every work-
15See f.e., Murnane et al. 1995, Heckman et al. 2006, Lindqvist and Vestman 2011, Castex and Dechter
2014, Deming 2017, Edin et al. 2017 and Jokela et al. 2017)
16Table 4 shows the results based on the above OLS specification for a pooled sample of workers in 2010
and 2015. The results suggest that both maths and language skills have a positive labour market return. The
gradient is particularly steep for high advanced maths skills. There are two levels of maths in high-school
and I treat them as separate subject so as to keep the specification simple. An alternative specification
would be to interact maths skills with the level of maths.
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place and in every occupation excluding all the students in my main main empirical anal-
ysis.
Finally, using the above empirical estimates in (4) and (5), I measure match quality by
the difference between predicted market return and return in job j
M̂i,j ≡ Si β̂ j − Si β̂ (6)
This provides the measure of matching I use in the empirical analysis.
3.3 Mismatch of Talent in the Early Career
Before to main empirical analysis, it is useful to study what the above mismatch mea-
sures tell us about students transition to the labour market in general. Figures 1 (a)-(c)
characterize the distribution of estimated worker-job mismatch as a function of time from
the program participation. Both figures demonstrate that, at the time of applying to the
internship program (t − 1), there is a considerable mismatch between the jobs students
hold and the skills they have. For example, Figure 1 (a) shows that a significant mass of
students are placed in the to positive side of the mismatch distribution. In particular, 66
percent of students are working in a firm or a workplace where they can expect to earn
less than the market return for their individual skill-set. On average this mismatch is
around 54 percent of annual earnings as demonstrated in Figure 1 (c). Similarly, based
on occupational mismatch measure, 70 percent of students are working in an occupa-
tion where they can expect to earn less than expected with their skill-set (Figure 1 (b)).
On average, students earn 40 percent less than expected with their skills in their current
occupation.
On the other hand, Figures 1 (a)-(c) also clearly demonstrate that there is a significant
improvement in match quality over time as students transition to labour markets. First,
as seen in both Figures (a) and (b), mismatch distribution shifts to to the left, i.e., the
majority of students become better matched in the following years. Indeed, the share of
mismatched students drop to 45 and 31 percent based on the firm and occupational mea-
sure respectively. Also, the average mismatch becomes significantly smaller 26 percent
and -9 percent respectively.
Now it is useful to also compare how these mismatch numbers compare to other mea-
sures of labour market engagement. Consider first Figure 1 (d) which shows the share
of students working in selected occupational categories. There are two important trends.
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First, the share of students who are working in professional occupations increases from
mere 10 percent before the subsidy program to over 45 percent in the following 5 years.
In contrast, the share of students who are working in low skilled service and sales occu-
patins or clerical office jobs declines significantly. Thus, an important driver of the declin-
ing occupational mismatch is the shift of students away from low-skilled occupations to
professional occupations.
These descriptive facts characterize quantitatively the fact that most students are work-
ing in jobs and workplaces in which their skills do not earn the highest or even the market
return. However, as students enter the labour market, many can expect to get a hold of
a job where they are. However, how exactly this transition happens remains still unex-
plored. This motivates the main empirical analysis in this paper that we are going to go
next.
4 The Effect of Subsidies on Labour Market Outcomes
This section presents the empirical analysis of the effects of the subsidy program on stu-
dents labour market outcomes. I begin studying the pre-treatment characteristics of the
program applicants. I then specify the empirical strategy I will use in most of the empir-
ical analysis and present the baseline results. Finally, I study how the subsidy program
affected matching in the early career labour markets using alternative matching measures.
4.1 Pre-treatment Characteristics of Subsidy Applicants
Table 1 shows the pre-treatment characteristics of the 921 students who applied for an
internship subsidy in 2010-2013. Columns (1) and (2) show the characteristics of the ap-
plicants who were initially assigned a subsidy and those who were initially not assigned
a subsidy, respectively. Overall, the two groups are balanced and one cannot reject a joint
null hypothesis test (F = 0.91, p = 0.57). Most individual statistics are also not statisti-
cally significantly different between (see Column 3) as expected under random allocation
of subsidies.
The average applicant is 26 years old and 72 percent of applicants are women. These
are typical numbers for university students in Finland and for the Faculty of Social Sci-
ence majors, although the average age is also influenced by the fact that there are a few
students above 50 years old. At the time of applying, average student has around 160
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study credits, which is just below the requirement for a bachelor’s degree (180). As the
target degree for most of the students is a Master’s, one can expect students to graduate
within two years of the program.
The majority of applicants have some pre-existing labour market experience. At the
time of application, more than 60 percent of the students have an active labour market
contract and have worked on average almost nine months during the year. However,
the majority of students are working in low skilled occupations and the most frequent
occupational title is a sales worker. Many of the students are also working less than full
time which is evident when looking at their annual earnings which are around 10,000
euros compared to the 25,000 euro average earnings of workers in the same occupations
among the full population and compared to co-workers who also earn on average 26,000-
29,000 euros.
4.2 Empirical Strategy
To test the effects of the subsidy on students labour market outcomes, I estimate intention
to treat effects using an event-study -type framework. The motivation is that it allows
me to fully take advantage of the panel dimension of the administrative data sources and
transparently describe how students progress in their early career labour market transi-
tions. In particular, I estimate models of the following form




(τs + βs ∗ Assignedi)1{Sj(i)t = s}+ Xiγ + εit (7)
where Sj(i)t is the time to subsidy application and 1{Sj(i)t = s} is a set of dummies for
student i having been assigned the subsidy s months ago, Assignedi is a dummy for stu-
dents who were assigned a subsidy at t − 1 and Xi includes application quota fixed ef-
fects. My main interests lies in the coefficients βs which captures the difference between
the students who were assigned a subsidy compared to workers that were not assigned a
subsidy at time s.
In the majority of the analyses, the unit of analysis is an applicant-year or an applicant-
month. The sample consist of 914 applicants. In the baseline analysis, I will focus on
specifications where I include applicants who applied more than once for a subsidy, but
cluster all standard errors at the individual applicant level. However, carrying out the
analyses with a sample restricted to first-time applicants does not materially affect any of
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the following results.
4.3 Internships, Peers and Job Characteristics
Figures 2 (a)-(d) characterize students’ labour market transition during the subsidy pro-
gram and the following four years using both individual level work-history data at the
monthly frequency and annual registry based data.
First, Figures 2 (a) and 3 (a) show that students assigned the subsidy are significantly
more likely to work for a public sector employer during the 12 months when they may
benefit from the subsidy. Given that students in social sciences mostly do internships in
the public sector, this is a clear indication that the subsidy helps the assigned students to
land internships during the year when assigned the subsidy. On the one hand, Figure 2
(a) shows that summer months before and during the subsidy program are when a signif-
icant share of students work in the public secotr. However, during the subsidy program
this spike is significantly higher for the treated students and starting from June when stu-
dents are on a summer break and are also expected to do the majority of the internships.
The difference between the treated and control group is 12 percentage points which is
around 50 percent increase from the previous year and 40 percent increase compared to
the control group. In contrast, what is also clear from the figure, is that the subsidy assign-
ment seems not to be associated with any long-run impact on public sector employment
as assigned and non-assigned students are equally likely to work in the public sector in
the two years following the assignment.
Figures 2 (b) and 3 (b) shows a similar figures for monthly employment. The fig-
ures demonstrate two important regularities. First, in during their studies, students work
mostly in the summer months, but start working during the whole years as their studies
progress. Second, the effects of the subsidy on employment is negligible. While there
is again a spike in employment during the summer months of the assignment, the dif-
ference is much smaller in both relative and absolute magnitude than for public sector
employment. However, there appears to be no significant crowding out of private sec-
tor employment as there is no difference in private secotr employment. This suggests
that most students hold on to additional private sector jobs in addition to the internships.
This is consistent with working shorter hours in service sector jobs which are common
among students as show in the previous section.
Figures 4 (a) and 5 (a) show that students are more likely to receive study credits for
an internship when assigned a subsidy. The difference is more pronounced in the first
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year, likely due to the fact that applicants who were not allocated a subsidy can re-apply
again in the following year. However, this measure clearly misses a significant fraction
of actual internships that actually took place. In particular, the Faculty reports that 75
percent of the treated student actually took up the subsidy, yet only 40 percent of these
students are registered in the internship subsidy records by two years time.17 One way to
adjust for this discrepancy would be to scale these observed internship credits based on
these aggregate take-up figures by a factor of 1.875. In this case, the difference in absolute
terms between the treated and control would be around 28 percentage points and 215
percent in the first year and 20 percentage points and 72 percent in the following year.
Figures 2 (c)-(d) and 3 (c)-(d) characterise the coworkers students are exposed to over
time and reveal two key findings. First, over time students are exposed to more and
more skilled coworkers over time as the average earnings of their coworkers increases
during the six years by around one fourth from below 30,000 to over 37,000 and the share
of co-worker with a Master’s degree almost doubles from 20 to 40 percent. This char-
acterises the dramatic shift in the peers the students are exposed to once entering the
labour markets. Second, during the program year, students assigned a subsidy have both
higher earning and more educated coworkers. This suggest that the program pushes and
exposes students to more prestigious and more skilled workplaces and away from low-
skilled workplaces that they typically work in during their studies.
Another way to see how the program pushes students to more prestigious jobs is to
look at the occupations they hold. Figures 4 (c)-(e) and 5 (c)-(e) address these issues. First,
Figures 4 (c) and 5 (c) shows that treated students are significantly more likely to work
in a professional job on the program year. The difference between the treated and control
group is over 5 percentage points or 25 percent relative to the control group. These results
suggest that the program was effective in achieving its primary purpose, which is to al-
low the students to get professional work experience before graduating. However, more
interestingly, there is a significant persistent effect also in the following years where the
treatment group is again 5 percentage points more likely to keep working in professional
jobs. Figures (d) and (e) provide additional evidence that treated students were working
in more prestigious and more skill-demanding occupations by showing that they were
working in higher paid occupations with more skilled occupational peers.
Finally, Figures 4 (b) and 5 (b) show that treated students out earn their control-peers
17There is no strict deadline to register an internship so, in theory, it may also be registered in the follow-
ing year in my data.
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by around 1000 euros in annual earnings. Importantly, both treated and control students
see large increases in their annual earnings which is consistent with both increasing work
hours and higher paid jobs as suggested above. However, treated students see faster
earnings growth up to 3 years after the program after which the control students catch
up.
4.4 The Effect of Subsidies on Matching Workers and Jobs
The previous evidence suggests that the subsidy program successfully provided students
exposure to professional jobs with higher skill requirements and exposure to more skilled
peers. Next, I will investigate whether the program was successful in helping students
access jobs that were better suited for their skills. For this purpose, I will focus on skill
mismatch measures developed in the previous sections.
The main empirical results are presented in Figures 2 (f) and Figures 3 (f) which show
the firm-worker match quality around the subsidy assignment program. These figures
show that the treated students were working in workplaces where their skills could earn
up to 20 percent higher return than similar workers in the control group. While the
monthly results are somewhat noisy, the effects is persistently positive and pooling the
effects over time yields an estimate of around 12 percent higher expected earnings in the
five years following treatment (see Table 2, Panel B).18 Similar results follow from the
analysis that concentrates on the occupation match measure (see Figure 4 (f) and 5 (f)).
However, the mismatch effect is more pronounced in the initial program year when the
effect is around 12 percent in expected earnings. On average, the reduction in occupa-
tional mismatch is around 5 percent in expected earnings during the five years following
the program.
Another way to analyse the match between workers and jobs which does not rely on
estimating skill returns is to simply look at the earnings premium of college graduates
at the workplace that students work in (see Figures 2 (e) and 3 (e)). Indeed, the treated
students are working in workplaces where a Master’s degree has an up to 10 percentage
point earnings premium.
18Firm match quality here is not mismatch as in the other figures but a match quality. This was not
intentional, but it is a mistake and will be corrected. However, it will only change the sign of not the
implication the results.
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4.5 Subsidy, Mismatch and Earnings
Now, if the main channel through which the subsidy program is by allowing students to
match to better jobs, we would expect that students who are initially most lacking expe-
rience, or who are working in jobs very far away from where their skills would provide
the highest return, would be most likely to benefit from such a program.
To investigate this more formally, I will compare the effects of the subsidy program
by the initial mismatch and consider its effects on students. Table 3 shows the results in
a pooled specification which allows for an interaction between initial mismatch and the
treatement status. Panel A shows that there is no significant heterogeneity in the effects
of the subsidy on work experience in the public sector on on employment neither in the
short or the long run. This suggest that initial misallocation did not affect the type of
internships individuals went to during the program year. However, it also suggests that
even those who were significantly mismatched initially, were not held back in terms of
employment.
Things look different however, once one studies the heterogeneity in earnings re-
sponses in Panel B. In particular, students who were working in workplaces where they
were earning little for their skill set, benefited more from the subsidy program in terms of
future earnings. These earnings responses were more concentrated in the few years fol-
lowing the assignment. This suggests that the program improved exactly those students’
worker-job matches who were initially most severely misallocated.
5 Conclusion
This paper studies the impact of internship subsidies on early career outcomes of uni-
versity students in Finland using a unique administrative dataset, an experimental re-
search design. The results suggests that the internship subsidy program improved stu-
dents labour market attachment by promoting access them to higher ranked occupations,
jobs in their own field and jobs in more prestigious workplaces as measured by co-worker
characteristics. Further, by using a new measure of worker-job match quality based on
individual skill measures, I show that the subsidy assignment improves the matching of
students to jobs in which the students have a higher return.
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Table 1: Pre-Treatment Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated Control (1)-(2) p-value
Panel A: Student Characteristics
Age 26.23 26.07 0.03 0.88
(3.75) (3.67) (0.23)
Women (%) 72.33 72.71 -0.45 0.87
(44.79) (44.59) (2.84)
GPA (0-5) 3.67 3.65 0.03 0.36
(0.53) (0.51) (0.03)
Study Credits 165.34 163.52 -0.66 0.90
(88.44) (78.53) (5.28)
On Student Benefits (%) 81.16 86.65 -4.44 0.06
(39.15) (34.04) (2.38)
Panel B: Job Characteristics
Earnings (euros) 10243.15 9814.96 122.32 0.82
(8947.67) (8167.61) (534.68)
Work Months 8.80 8.63 0.11 0.68
(3.71) (3.85) (0.27)
Employed (%) 64.65 62.35 2.40 0.46
(47.86) (48.50) (3.24)
Professionals (%) 6.98 6.97 -1.41 0.39
(25.51) (25.49) (1.64)
Techn./Assoc. Prof (%) 7.91 6.57 1.61 0.36
(27.02) (24.81) (1.76)
Clerical (%) 15.58 13.55 2.46 0.30
(36.31) (34.26) (2.39)
Service and Sales (%) 19.30 21.71 -1.16 0.67
(39.51) (41.27) (2.72)
Occ. Earnings (euros) 24911.31 24579.66 -361.69 0.62
(9185.37) (9126.95) (726.21)
Panel C: Workplace Characteristics
Coworker Earnings (euros) 29169.35 26381.31 2338.89 0.05
(14792.30) (13554.82 (1205.37)
Secondary Degree (%) 44.39 47.21 -2.63 0.18
(22.91) (22.44) (1.96)
Bachelors’s Degree (%) 13.53 14.90 -1.32 0.19
(11.50) (12.54) (1.02)
Master’s Degree (%) 20.19 15.65 4.31 0.02
(23.00) (19.75) (1.88)
N 430 502 932
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Table 2: Pooled ITT Estimates of Employment and Worker-Job Mismatch
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Employment
P(Works in Public Sector) P(Has any job)
0-12m 0-60m 0-12m 0-60m
Subsidy 0.058*** 0.004 0.007 -0.014
(0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.016)
N 11,622 54,534 11,622 54,534
Quota FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Match Quality
Workplace Mismatch Occupation Mismatch
0-12m 0-60m 0-12m 0-60m
Subsidy -0.52 -0.120* -0.120** -0.51*
(0.070) (0.072) (0.048) (0.028)
N 6,988 32,814 530 2,991
Quota FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
26
Table 3: Pre-Treatement Mismatch, Employment and Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Mismatch and Employment
P(Works in Public Sector) P(Has any job)
0-12m 0-60m 0-12m 0-60m
Subsidy 0.091*** 0.003 0.016 -0.004
(0.029) (0.028) (0.022) (0.017)
Subsidy*Mismatch -0.022 0.014 -0.004 0.000
(0.025) (0.023) (0.018) (0.014)
Mismatch 0.024 -0.010 -0.014 -0.007
(0.020) (0.017) (0.015) (0.012)
N 9,451 44,347 9,451 44,347
Quota FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Mismatch and Earnings
Annual Earnings (’000) Annual Earnings (’000)
0-12m 0-60m 0-12m 0-60m
Subsidy -0.576 -0.161 0.114 0.785
(0.986) (1.054) (1.368) (1.359)
Subsidy*Mismatch 1.902*** 1.803* 0.362 0.995
(0.819) (0.985) (1.716) (1.887)
Mismatch -2.086*** -2.052*** -3.034*** -1.051
(0.663) (0.785) (1.080) (1.182)
N 491 2,427 474 2,359
Quota FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 4: Language and Math Skills Have
a Positive Labour Market Return
(1)
Wage





















Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p <
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Figure 1: Mismatch over Time
Note: Panel (a) shows distribution of match quality before and after the subsidy as-
signment based on comparing returns skill at the workplace to the market return.
Panel (b) shows distribution of match quality before and after the subsidy assignment
based on comparing individual returns to skill in the occupation to the market return.
Panel (c) shows the average mismatch as a function of time from aubsidy assignment.
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(f) Workplace Match
Figure 2: Trends in Workplace Outcomes by Subsidy Assignment Status
Note: Panel (a) shows the probability of working in the public sector as a function of
time from the subsidy assignment by assignment status. Similarly, panel (b) shows the
probability of working in any job, panel (c) shows the average earnings of coworkers
in the same establishment, panel (d) shows the share of coworkers with a Master’s
degree. Panel (e) shows the earnings gap between the college graduates (Master’s
degree) vs non graduates at the workplace. Panel (f) shows the workplace match
quality (negative of mismatch). All figures are based on individual work history files
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(f) Workplace Match
Figure 3: ITT Effects of Assignment on Workplace Outcomes
Note: These figures show event-study results comparing the outcomes of students
who were initially assigned an internship subsidy vs those who were not. Panel (a)
shows the probability of working in the public sector as a function of time from the
subsidy assignment. Similarly, panel (b) shows the probability of working in any
job, panel (c) shows the average earnings of coworkers in the same establishment,
panel (d) shows the share of coworkers with a Master’s degree. Panel (e) shows the
earnings gap between the college graduates (Master’s degree) vs non graduates at the
workplace. Panel (f) shows the workplace match quality (negative of mismatch). All
figures are based on individual work history files and use information on the contract
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(f) Occupational Mismatch
Figure 4: The Effect of Assignment on Workplace Outcomes
Note: These figures show trends in job characteristics as a function of years from the
subsidy assignment by assignment status. Panel (a) shows the probability of register-
ing an internship credit in the study registry as a function of time from the subsidy
assignment. Similarly, panel (b) shows annual earnings, panel (c) shows the proba-
bility of working in a professional occupation, panel (d) shows the average earnings
among all workers in the same occupational code and panel (e) shows the share col-
lege graduates (Master’s degree) among all workers in the same occupational code.
Panel (f) shows the occupational mismatch showing the gap between earnings in cur-
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(f) Occupational Mismatch
Figure 5: The Effect of Assignment on Workplace Outcomes
Note: These figures show event-study results comparing the outcomes of students
who were initially assigned an internship subsidy vs those who were not. Panel (a)
shows the probability of registering an internship credit in the study registry as a
function of time from the subsidy assignment. Similarly, panel (b) shows annual earn-
ings, panel (c) shows the probability of working in a professional occupation, panel
(d) shows the average earnings among all workers in the same occupational code and
panel (e) shows the share college graduates (Master’s degree) among all workers in
the same occupational code. Panel (f) shows the occupational mismatch showing the
gap between earnings in current occupation vs expected earnings with students skill-
set.
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This paper studies whether sorting of individuals to segregated environments con-
tributes to assortative mating. Taking advantage of extensive Finnish administrative
data, I document that i) there is a strong positive assortative mating pattern by so-
cioeconomic status and skill and ii) partner choices are stronly associated with the
social environments individuals are exposed to. Next, leveraging discontinuities in
high-school assignments, I show that students assigned to a specific school at age 16
are two times more likely to cohabit with or marry a person from that school at age
26 compared to those who were assigned to a ex-ante similar close-by school. How-
ever, even large jumps in high-school peer characteristics do not translate to persistent
changes in partner characteristics. These results suggest that although sorting may be
important for meeting up potential partners, sorting in itself may not be sufficient for
generating significant assortative mating patterns.
∗First version: May 1, 2019. This version: January 18, 2021. I thank Michele Belot, Caroline Hoxby, Juha
Härkönen, Andrea Ichino, David Levine, Dominik Sachs and seminar participants at EUI and Jyväskylä for
their helpful comments.
†European University Institute; Email: tuomo.virkola@eui.eu.
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Partner choices play an important role in explaining earnings differences between
households. A wealth of evidence in social science documents that individuals marry and
partner up with people who are in economically meaningful ways similar to themselves.1
This assortative mating pattern has become increasingly relevant as it amplifies how re-
cent changes in individual level earnings distribution translate to household level earnings
inequality.2 One plausible factor that can lead to assortative mating is the sorting of indi-
viduals into homogenous environments, such as schools, workplaces, or neighborhoods,
where interactions with partner candidates are more likely to take place. However, in-
dividuals typically sort into these environments based on their earnings, skills, family
background or preferences making it hard to distinguish between different mechanisms
that could lead to observed levels of assortative mating or household inequality.
In this paper, I leverage extensive administrative data from Finland and the features
of the Finnish high-school assignment system to make progress in understanding the
role of social sorting on assortative mating. The administrative data allows me to over-
come two key difficulties that typically make it hard to evaluate causal drivers of partner
choices. The first difficulty is to be able to accurately measure and identify the social
environments that individuals are part of or exposed to. I use high-schools as a clearly
defined social environment in which a student is expected interact daily for three years
with their close peers. Second difficulty is to isolate differences in individual preferences
and the social environment, as preferences are likely to affect both social sorting and mat-
ing preferences.3 Thus, wealthy families are likely to cluster into similar neighbourhoods,
professionals are likely to sort into similar workplaces, and students sort into schools and
colleges based on their aspirations. To make progress, I use Finnish administrative data
to identify when and to to which high-schools individuals were allocated to and match
these data to data on the universe of couples. Second, I exploit the fact that high-school
assignments are based on a transparent system where students elementary school GPA is
used to select students to their schools of preferences. Using the combination of these data
and a way to allows to provide new results on the potential factors leading to assortative
mating.
1See Berscheid et al. (1971), Schwartz and Mare (2005), Li et al. (2013), Schwartz (2013), Fisman et al.
(2006), Fisman et al. (2008), Hitsch et al. (2010b), Hitsch et al. (2010a) andBelot and Francesconi (2013) for
mating choices.
2See Kremer (1997), Fernández and Rogerson (2001), Fernández et al. (2005) for older and Eika et al.
(2018), Greenwood et al. (2014), Greenwood et al. (2016a), Greenwood et al. (2016b) Greenwood et al. (2017)
for more recent takes on the distributional consequences.
3It is also possible that social environment affects mating preferences.
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I provide three main empirical results. First, I show that there is a significant degree
of assortative mating in Finland that is comparable to other Western countries. I start by
documenting that individuals tend to partner up with others who have a similar level of
educational outcomes and similar socioeconomic background.
Second, I present evidence that sorting into social environments in adolescence is an
important determinant of partner choices moving into adulthood. I document that, on
average, around 10 percent of Finnish adult couples are formed between men and women
who went to the same high-school and at the same time between age 16 to 18. Next,
leveraging an RDD from high-school assignments, I show that a significant share of this
observed pattern is causally driven by high-school assignments rather than individual
preferences. In particular, I show that being just barely assigned to the same high-school
increases the probability of partnering up and living together at age 26 by fifty percent
(4.5 p.p. vs 3 p.p.) relative to those who were assigned to a similar nearby school due to
marginally missing the selection cut-off.
Third, I leverage heterogeneity in school and peer characteristics to study the impor-
tance of social environment on the quality of partners. I show that being assigned to a
more selective school increases exposure to higher skilled and higher socioeconomic sta-
tus peers. However, this exposure does not translate to higher partner skills of higher
partner socieconomic status. Instead, I find that while schools are an important meet-
ing place for social interactions and partner formation, other factors are more important
when it comes to assortativ mating patterns. These results suggest that social mixing poli-
cies may not help in alleviating concerns related to assortative mating and its effects on
household level income inequality.
This paper contributes to the literature on the nature of assortative mating and its con-
sequences on family income inequality (Greenwood et al. (2014), Eika et al. (2018), Gihleb
and Lang (2016), Schwartz and Mare (2005), Breen and Salazar (2011), Schwartz (2013)
Bratsberg et al. (2018)). The closest paper to ours is recent work by Mogstadt et al .. 2018
which uses a similar decomposition exercise to study the contribution of different factors
to family income inequality over time. Our study adds to that literature by examining
changes in.. etc.
This paper also complements previous literature on determinants of family formation,
which has aimed to characterize how much of the observed aggregate sorting patterns
could be explained by preferences (Berscheid et al. (1971), Li et al. (2013)Hitsch et al.
(2010a)Hitsch et al. (2010b)Eastwick and Finkel (2008) Gautier et al. (2010) Fisman et al.
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(2006), Fisman et al. (2008) Belot and Francesconi (2013)). This literature has exploited
the richness of the data on preferences and matches that are available from from the early
stages of family formation, including online dating and speeddating contexts. I concen-
trate on the more long run outcomes to complement this literature. I provide evidence
which suggest that in addition to preferences, much of the observed sorting pattersn coul
be driven by the environment in which individuals spend their time.
This paper also contributes to the literatue on the effects of high-school assignments
on students. On the one hand, much of this literature suggests that assignments to even
the most prestiguous and sought-after schooling environments do not readily translate
to private human capital gains (seee e.g., Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2014) and the following
literature). On the other hand, there are many other reasons to prefer more prestiguous
schooling environments, one of which is to prefer interactions with higher quality peers.
My analysis suggest that this is also likely to have consequences also for family formation.
The paper that is closest to my analysis is the one by Artmann et al. (2018) who study
how university admission loteries in the Netherlands affect partner’s earnings and the
probability of marrying someone from the same field.4 My analysis complements their
analysis in several important ways that allow to understand the mechanisms of sorting
in greater detail. First, I am able to isolate sorting in educational institutions from those
due to labor market overlap as I am able to identify the whether individuals went to
the same detailed school-program at the same time. I can also provide predictions that
apply to large share of the population compared toany specific educational degree such
as medical students.
I proceed as follows. In Section 2, I describe the Finnish educational system and its
relevant aspects for my analysis. In Section 3, I describe the data and variables used
through out the paper. In Section 4, I characterize assortative mating in Finland using
measrues based on education, earnings and skill. In section 5, I present the empirical
strategy to evaluate the role fo social sorting on partner choices. In section 6, I conclude
with a discussion of the results and next steps.
1 Institutional Background
To understand high-school assignments and the data I use in the empirical analysis, it
is helpful to describe Finnish educational institutions in some detail. The system con-
4Kirkeboen et al. (2016)
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sits of three main levels: basic education, secondary education and tertiary education
and it is illustrated in Figure ??. Basic education consists of 9 years of coursework in the
elementary school. All students follow the same core curriculum and are typically as-
signed to schools based on their residential address and school catchment areas.5 After
compulsory education, students may apply to three-year programs in high-schools (for-
mally called secondary schools in Finland). High-schools are divided to vocational and
academic tracks, providing different types of skill and training. Academic track schools
consist of general education in sciences and humanities. The primary aim is to prepare
students to apply to tertiary education. Vocational programs concentrate on specific skills
and practical labour market training, and to provide skills to enter labour markets.6
High-school assignments are centralized at the national level and based on a tranpar-
ent ranking system, which makes it useful for our empirical analysis. First, the applica-
tions open during the 9th grade spring spring term (around February-March), students
select up to five programs in the order of their preference and submit their preferences to
the Joint Application System (Yhteishakujärjestelmä), a nationwide clearing house. Most
students apply to programs in their own municipality of residence, but students are free
to apply to all programs in Finland. A program is a study track in a given school. Vo-
cational schools often have multiple tracks that provide specialized training in a given
speciality, but Academic schools typically only include a single track per school as they
are required to offer the same basic curriculum to all students.
Second, in June when students receive their elementary school graduating diplomas,
students are preliminarily ranked in each school they applied to and offered a spot in the
first school their preliminary ranking allows them to get into. In the majority of academic
high-schools, these rankings are based solely on compulsory school final GPA.7 In voca-
tional schools, schools are free to choose the weights attached to each elementary school
subject, but acceptance is still primarily a function of the GPA. After some student have
declined their initial offer, there is room for accepting leftover spots in the schools where
students applied, but were not initially accepted. This last stage takes about two weeks
after which the final allocations are announced.
5There are special track schools to which students can apply to, but these are a small minority. Further,
in more recent years, there has been more freedom to choose a schhol that is different from the schhol intake
area.
6To be clear, from both schools students may apply to Bachelor’s -level programs in univesities of ap-
plied sciences and polytechnics from which they can continue al the way to university level programs.
7Some special track schools may also use additional tests and pre-assignements to select their students,
but even in these cases, GPA still typically enters the ranking criterion.
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2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
This section describes the administrative data sources I use in the empirical analysis. I first
describe the population level data and then describe the high-school application data.
Partners Identifying partners in the registry data is central to the empirical analysis. To
identify partners, I use extensive data from Finnish population census and registers. In
particular, I use data starting from year 1970 to 2015 which includes identifiers for families
and their household members. Family identifiers are based on the housing unit which is,
in princple, derived from information on the housing address. Partners are identified
from living in the same address, being opposite sex and having amaximum of 18 years of
age difference. Additional adjustments are made using information child births so that
partners who do not live in the same address but have a child, are identified a partners.
It also includes married couples living in the same address as well as partners who are
simply cohabiting.
The strength of using cohabitation as the starting point in our analysis has the benefit
that we can identify couples early on before they get married (which usually happens
after some years of cohabitation) and over time as marriage rates have gone down even if
probability of partnering up has not. However, a possible concern with cohabitation data
is that we may mistakenly classify flatmates as couples in cases where the couple do not
have children and are not married or in a registered relationship.
Parental Earnings I use parental taxable income averaged over the 5 years prior to high-
school applications as the primary measure of socieconomic status. This is beneficial as it
has been measured consistently over time and is based on tax registry data. Thus, I avoid
bias and measurement error due to potential misreporting prevalent in survey based
datasets. To abstract from changes in the distribution of earnings, I transform parental
earnings into earnings percentiles by student cohorts.
High-School Choices My empirical analysis relies on a wealth of information from the
Join Application Registry (Yhteishakurekisteri). The data contain information on the uni-
verse of secondary school applicants, their ranking of each program, up to 5 programs
per student, the initially assigned school slots, and their final school allocation. The data
also contains accompanying information that determines students acceptance to each pro-
gram, including elementary school GPA and prior educational attainment. I restrict the
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baseline sample to first-time applicants with no missing information on key variables that
I exploit in the empirical analysis. I concentrate on students who were 15-17 year olds to
focus on those who truly were first time applicants from those that have applied in previ-
ous years which we do not observe in the dataset. I drop students whose GPA is missing
as we cannot run the RDD in these cases and it must be the case that selection was not
based on GPA.
Descriptive statistics Table 1 characterizies the high-school applicants and selections
after the above restrictions. Panel B shows that applicants are on average 16.11 years old,
46 percent are women and on average are placed in the 58th percentile of the parental
income distribution. Women tend to have higher pre-highschool educational attainment
as the GPA is around 0.5 standard deviations higher than that for men.
Panel B shows that the majority of applicants are offered a spot to their preferred
study program. On average, 59 percent get accepted to their first choice. On the other
hand, between 15 to 10 percent of applicants are offered a slot also in the other programs.
Panel C shows that almost half of applicants apply to an academic track program while
the other half applies to vocational track programs. Peer characteristics reflect population
level averages, but it is notable that men apply to programs with more men, lower GPA
and lower socieconomic status peers than women.
3 Descriptive Analysis of Assortative Mating
To meausure assortative mating so that it is are not sensitive to changes in the income dis-
tributions between men and women nor endogenous labour market participation choices,
I concentrate on parental income rank correlations and standardized test scores. In par-
ticular, I estimate equations of the form
PWi,t = αt + βtP
M
i,t + εi,t (1)
where PMi,t is the man’s characteristic and P
W
i,t is the woman’s characteristic score. In these
specifications, βt measures the degree of relative assortative mating at time t. With these
estimates, the expected difference between the highest ranked and the lowest ranked
woman’s partner’s rank is 100 x βt (and analoguously for the men). Thus, for an esti-
mate of β = 0.2 we expect that that the partner of the top woman is ranked 20 percentiles
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higher than the bottom woman’s.
Figures 2a and 2b and Table 2 show strong assortative mating patterns based on two
alternative measures in binned scatter plots. First, panel (a) shows that the higher the
(standardized) GPA, the higher is partner’s (standardized) GPA. Overall, a one standard
deviation increase in GPA predicts a 0.39 increase in partner’s GPA (see Table 2, col-
umn 1). On the other hand, there is a similar strong assortative mating pattern based
on parental income ranks (Panel b). A 10 percentage point increase in parental income
rank predicts a 2 percentage point higher partner’s rank (see Table 2, column 1). To put
this figure in percpective, it is comparable in magnitude to the intergenerational earnings
correlation measured using Finnish administrative data.
Table 2 columns (2) and (4) suggest that partner choices and the school environment
are strongly associated. In particular, controlling for high-school peer characteristics ac-
counts for a significant part of the partner correlations. A naive interpretation would
suggest that up to 50 percent of the partner correlation could be explained by high-school
peers. However, this estimate does not have any causal interpretation, as individuals can
select into schools based on their preferences.
4 Empirical Strategy
To understand the mechanisms that drive assortative mating, I take advantage of the lo-
cal random assignement of students to high-schools. The setting exploits the fact that
admissions to Finnish high-schools are a function of elementary school GPA which, with
limited student intake and oversubscription, generates unpredictable cutoff points in stu-
dent admissions. Next, I will lay out the main equation of interest to make clear what we
aim to identify.
4.1 School Admissions and Partner Choice
The first question we would like to answer in this section is whether being assigned to a
particular social environment (high-school) affects who an indivial partners up with later
in adulthood. Thus, the first equation of interest is
Partnerj(i),t = βAdmissionj,i,t + f (Xi) + εi (2)
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where Admissionj,i,t is an indicator for individual i being admitted to school-program j
in year t and Partnerj(i),t is an indicator for individual i having a partner who also went
to school j. However, clearly β will be biased estimate of the effect as long as selection to
schools is not randomly assigned. Students who have a preference for particular school
are more likely to come from the same neighborhood or have similar pre-exsting prefer-
ences that may or may not be correlated with partner choices. Further, these preferences
are likely to be related to individual skill and predicted earnings: skilled students are
likely to apply to similar programs and less skilled students are more likely to apply to
similar programs. Thus, naive correlations with participation or admission to the same
program can give spurious results and maynot help making progres in understanding
the mecanisms of assortative mating.
To avoid selection issues, I exploit discontinuities in acceptance to individual school
programs. In particular, the first stage takes the form
Admissioni,j,t = g(Xi) + π11(Xi ≥ Xj,0) + εi (3)
where Xj,0 is the lowest GPA that guarantees acceptance to program j, Xi is student i
elementray school GPA and g(Xi) is a flexible function of GPA. Now, since the exact
cutoff which guarantees acceptance X0 is unknown ex-ante (more evidence to support
this is shown below), there is no reason to expect that preferences for school programs
and, more importantly, for partners changes at the cutoff. Thus, close to the cutoff we
have random variation in admissions, and as a result, random variation in the social
environment.
Next, I can study the effects of assignment discontinuities in a reduced form frame-
work which are helpful especially for demonstratin some of the key in a graphical setting,
Partnerj(i),t = h(Xi) + π11(Xi ≥ Xj,0) + µi (4)
where Partnerj(i),t is an indicator for individual i having a partner who went to school j.
Now, the RDD outlined above allows us to ask questions of how the assigned school
environment afects later life partner choices. This is helpful in order to make progress in
understanding observed sorting patters. On the one hand, high-schools are an interesting
case, because at ages 16 to 18 individuals are going through formative times when it
comes to romantic relationships. It is also an environement, where individuals interact
with other students for an extended period of time on a daily basis. It is thus not unlikely
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that many or even most students get to know each other in the school that they enroll
in. This is in contrast to larger insitutions such as universities where there are potentially
thousands of other students most of whom students never meet directly via the school
environment. This is helpful as it helps us to pinpoint where the interactions are likely to
take place.
4.2 Peer Composition and Partner Choices
The second question we would like to answer is how exposure to different types of peers
may translate to partner choices and partner characteristics. For example, does exposure
to high performing or high socio-economic status peers also affect the characteristics of
your partner? In particular, we would like to know how much of the observed assortative
mating pattern observed in Figures 2a and 2b could be explained by the shared social
environment. Ideally, we would like to estimate the following type of a relationship
Partner Skillj(i),t = βPeer Skillj(i),t + εi (5)
Now, similar to the case just mentioned above, peer skill is again endogenous. To
make progress, we need to control for the fact that individuals can select into peer groups.
In the empirical analysis, we will take advantage of the fact that students place higher
GPA schools higher in their ranking (there is always a chance to withdraw application and
get to the lower GPA school). In particular, we will exploit the fact that being admitted to
your first choice school is a significant predictor of the peer characteristics.
5 The Effect of Social Sorting on Partner Choices
This section discusses the main empirical results on how being assigned to a preferred
high-school affects partner choices at age 26. I first show graphical evidence on the re-
duced form relationship and then proceed to main IV results. These results are based on
those applicants who were on the margin of being admitted to an academic high-school.
Figure 3 (a) shows the clear discontinuity in the probability of enrolling in your pre-
ferred school once a student passes the minimum acceptance threshold. Enrolment jumps
by almost 50 percent exactly at the cut-off. Figure 3 (b) on the other hand shows the prob-
ability of partnering up with someone from your preferred school as a function of you
GPA. Probability of partnering up with someone from you preferred school increases
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from 3 to 4.5 percent at the admittance threshold. Thus, on average being admitted to
the same school increases the probability of partnering up with someone from that school
by 100 percent. This finding is strongly consistent with the idea that high-schools are an
empirically important meeting place for potential future partners.
Figure 4 shows the results on how being assigned to a preferred school affects the peers
individuals are exposed in high-schools and the partner characteristics. Both Panels (a)
and (b) show that being assigned to your preferred school increases exposure to high-
performing and high-socio-economic status peers. However, Panels (c) and (d) shows
that this exposure does not translate to partner characteristics. This is despite the finding
that partnering up is significantly driven by the school environment.
Table 3 shows the main IV results based on the RDD design. I concentrate on a simple
specification with a small symmetrical bandwith of 0.25 around the admission cut-offs
across all specifications to make them comparable. First, Panel A shows that an admission
to a preferred track increases the likelihood of partnering up with someone from the same
high-school by 2.9 p.p. which is a 82 percent increase over the baseline. The point estimate
is similar for both men and women, but for men the baseline probability of partnering up
with a school-mate is almost 50 percent higher.
Next, Panel B shows that there is a 0.9 standard deviation increase is peer GPA when
an applicant is admitted to a preferred program. This effect is similar in magnitude for
both men and women. However, Panel C shows that there is no significant increase in
partner’s GPA. The point estimate is 0.012 and statistically insignificant. This is very
much in contrast to the OLS results described above. The partial OLS coefficient in Table
2 would suggest that a similar increase in peer characteristics would predict a 0.151 x
0.907 = 0.137 increase in partner GPA holding individual GPA constant. These IV results
thus allow us to rule out an effect that is an order of magnitude smaller.
Panel D and E shows analogous effects based on parental income rank. First, ad-
mission to a preferred program has a significantly positive effect on peer socio-economic
characteristics. Admitted students are exposed to peers whose parents are almost 5 per-
centiles higher in the income rank. However, the effect on partner’s socioeconomic status
is not significant and the point estimate is even negative. Again, we can rule out an ef-
fect that is significantly smaller than predicted by the partial OLS coefficient from Table 2
which would predict an increase of 2.37 on the partner’s income percentile.




This paper studies how the social environment individuals are exposed to affects fam-
ily formation moving into adulthood. Using extensive administrative data sources and
taking advantage of the Finnish high/school assignments, I show that high-schools are
a meeting place for potential partners and that these meeting places are to an important
degree segregated by skill and socio economic status. Yet, these results suggest that seg-
regation in the educational environment may not be an important driver of assortative
mating.
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Figure 1: Timeline of Applications
Note: This figure illustrates the timeline of high-school assignments and measurement of
main outcome variables. Prospective students send high-school applications during the final
comprehensive school term in Febrary-March. Students receive the Final diploma at the end
of comprehensive school by end of May or early June. Preliminary student selections are
made in June and are based primarily on GPA. Between June and of August, students may
accept or reject school offers before the selections are finalized in end of August. Partner
choices are measured by age 26 whcih is the final year when the last 2007 high-school cohort
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Figure 2: Assortative Mating
Note: These figures show binned scatterplots of partner’s characteristics. Panel (a) shows the as-
sociation between individuals own standardized GPA and her partner’s standardized GPA at age
26. Panel (b) shows the association between individuals own parental income rank (measured at
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(b) Partner from applied school
Figure 3: The Effect of School Assignment on Partner Choice 10 Years Later
Note: These figures show the baseline reduced form effects from the RD design outlined in Sec-
tion 5. Panel (a) shows the probability of enrolling into first-choice school as a function of dis-
tance to the acceptance treshold. Panel (b) shows the probability that applicant was cohabiting
with a person who was accepted to the first-choice high-school as a function of distance to the
acceptance treshold to the first-choice school. All graphs show averages in equal sized bins of
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(d) Partner Income Rank
Figure 4: The Effect of School Assignment on Peer and Partner Characteristics
Note: These figures show the baseline reduced form effects from the RD design outlined in Sec-
tion 5. Panel (a) shows peer compulsory school GPA as a function of distance to the acceptance
treshold to preferred school. Similarly, panel (b) shows peer parent income rank. Panels (c) and
(d) show partner GPA and parent income rank for partners 10 years after school assignment (age
26). All graphs show averages in equal sized bins of 0.05 of the GPA.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on High-School Applicants
(1) (2) (3)
All Men Women
Panel A: Pre-Assignment Characteristics
Age 16.11 16.13 16.09
(0.67) (0.66) (0.67)
Woman 0.46 0.00 1.00
(0.50) (0.00) (0.00)
GPA 7.39 7.13 7.70
(1.15) (1.12) (1.11)
GPA (standardized) -0.00 -0.25 0.29
(1.00) (0.98) (0.94)
Parent Income Rank 58.25 58.49 57.98
(27.38) (27.37) (27.38)
Panel B: Offers
Accepted to 1st Choice 0.59 0.57 0.62
(0.49) (0.50 (0.48)
Accepted to 2nd Choice 0.14 0.14 0.13
(0.35) (0.35 (0.34)
Accepted to 3rd Choice 0.11 0.12 0.10
(0.31) (0.32 (0.29)
Accepted to 4th Choice 0.10 0.11 0.10
(0.30) (0.31 (0.29)
Accepted to 5th Choice 0.09 0.10 0.09
(0.29) (0.29 (0.29)
Panel C: Program Characteristics
Academic Track 0.48 0.39 0.57
(0.50) (0.49 (0.49)
Peer GPA 7.60 7.39 7.83
(0.86) (0.90 (0.76)
Peer GPA (standardized) -0.02 -0.26 0.24
(0.99) (1.03 (0.87)
Women Peers 0.49 0.35 0.65
(0.28) (0.28 (0.17)
Peer Parent Income Rank 58.54 57.46 59.72
(12.61) (12.61 (12.50)
N 1482039 770,089 711,950
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2: Partner Associations and Peer Characteristics
Partner’s GPA Partner’s Parent Income Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4)





Parent Income Rank 0.198*** 0.094***
[0.002] [0.003]
Peer Parent Income Rank 0.509***
[0.005]
N 372388 372388 186268 186268
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3: The Effects of Academic School Assignment
on Peers and Partner Characteristics
All Men Women
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: P(Has a Partner from the Applied School)
Admitted to Program 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.028***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
Mean .035 .043 .027
N 74350 38711 35639
Bandwith 0.25 0.25 0.25
p 0 0 0
Panel B: Peer GPA (standardized)
Admitted to Program 0.907*** 0.936*** 0.875***
[0.011] [0.016] [0.016]
Mean .535 .516 .555
N 63088 33027 30061
Bandwith 0.25 0.25 0.25
p 0 0 0
Panel C: Partner GPA (standardized)
Admitted to Program 0.012 0.012 0.042
[0.026] [0.032] [0.037]
Mean .079 .437 -.264
N 26133 12785 13348
Bandwith 0.25 0.25 0.25
p 0 0 0
Panel D: Peer Parent Income Rank
Admitted to Program 4.733*** 3.821*** 5.759***
[0.223] [0.304] [0.326]
Mean 65.013 65.354 64.635
N 46723 24545 22178
Bandwith 0.25 0.25 0.25
p 0 0 0
Panel E: Partner Parent Income Rank
Admitted to Program -1.120 -1.849 -0.536
[0.786] [1.141] [1.081]
Mean 60.597 61.845 59.487
N 21950 10329 11621
Bandwith 0.25 0.25 0.25
p 0 0 0
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05;
*** p < 0.01.
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Abstract
Why is Finland today an equal country? We employ newly collected historical data to document that
Finland was extremely unequal in terms of income and land distribution until a violent uprising in 1918
which was a major turning point in Finnish inequality. We show that high inequality partly originated
from the famine of 1866-1868 which increased the concentration of land and power to large landowners.
Regions with more exposure to the famine also had worse labor market outcomes and more coercion by
the early 1900s. Using unique micro-data on casualties of the Finnish Civil War, we demonstrate that the
famine contributed to insurgency participation through these factors. Although unsuccessful in replacing
the government, the insurgency led to significant policy changes, including radical land redistribution and
a full extension of franchise. A more drastic shift towards equality occurred in locations that were more
affected by the famine and that had higher levels of pre-conflict inequality and more insurgents. These
results indicate that equality has not been a persistent feature of the Finnish society inherent in its culture
or values but is instead an outcome of institutional changes.
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The Nordic countries are known for their redistributive policies and low levels of inequality. An
important but poorly answered question is whether equality is an innate part of these societies, or
if it is an outcome of institutional changes made in the more recent past.1
In this paper, we present historical evidence that aligns with the latter explanation. Using newly
collected municipality-level wealth and income statistics from Finland, we document that Finnish
inequality was considerable until a civil war that the country experienced in 1918. The primary
purpose of our paper is to use these data, combined with micro-data on insurgency participation,
to show that, within Finland, (i) high inequality and associated grievances directly led to insurgent
activity, and (ii) municipalities with more insurgents had a more sizable shift toward equality after
the conflict than other municipalities. These two main results are visible in Figure 1 where Panel
A illustrates the relationship between inequality in 1904 and insurgency in 1918, and Panel B plots
the connection between the insurgency and post-war decline in inequality.
To provide exogenous variation and explain high inequality in land ownership and income, we
start our empirical analysis from another historical turning point: the famine of 1866-1868.
According to historical accounts from the era, land ownership became persistently more
concentrated in areas more affected by the famine relative to other regions due to speculation and
foreclosures of farms and land of heavily indebted farmers (Gylling 1917). We use crop failures
in 1867 as an exogenous driver for the famine and find a strong and robust relationship between
later high inequality and measures of famine exposure.
In addition to the concentration of land ownership, the famine led to more labor market
coercion. Instead of rising workers’ wages, a likely result of labor scarcity in a free labor market,
the famine increased coercive tenant farming contracts, where the landowner can decide how
much work the tenant has to perform to rent land.2 As the prices of agricultural products
increased after the famine and there was upward pressure on wages due to labor scarcity, it was
logical for the land owners to have more coercive tenant-farming contracts (Domar 1970;
Acemoglu and Wolitzky 2011).3 Consistent with these mechanisms, we show that locations
1Some scholars of comparative economic development have suggested that the roots of modern-day outcomes are
in factors such as culture and social norms (Guiso et al. 2006; Luttmer and Singhal 2011; Berger and Engzell 2019),
or population heterogeneity (Alesina and Ferrara 2005; Ashraf and Galor 2013). Others have highlighted the role of
institutions in shaping countries’ long-run development (North 1990; Hall and Jones 1999; Porta et al. 1999; Robinson
et al. 2005).
2Tenant farmers usually paid their rent in workdays instead of money, and the number of days was generally at
the discretion of the land owner (Peltonen 1990; Peltonen 1992). As the land owners could ask the tenant to perform
tasks at will, there was less need for wage labor, putting downward pressure on wages. Peltonen (1990) argues that
the tenant farming institution hindered the emergence of the labor market.
3The large land owners were left with considerable market power, as rural workers had few outside options due
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Figure 1. Relationship between economic inequality, insurgency and redistribution.
Notes: The figures plot the relationship between economic inequality in 1904 and insurgency
(Panel A) and insurgency and decline in inequality (Panel B). Robust standard errors of the slope
coefficients are reported in parentheses. Dots are binned averages computed within twenty bins
with an equal number of observations. We net out baseline controls (latitude, longitude, log
suitability for rye, log suitability for barley, log elevation, and log population in 1865) and region
fixed effects. For further information on our data, see Section 3.
where a larger share of the population perished during the famine years, or that experienced an
exogenous crop failure shock in 1867, had more tenant farmers and lower agricultural wages.
This further bolstered the increasing inequalities of the era.
We propose that economic inequality and associated grievances catalyzed the Finnish Civil
War of 1918. This reasoning mainly follows the so-called discontent theories of civil conflict
(Moore 1966; Huntington 1968; Gurr 1970; Paige 1975; Muller and Seligson 1987). In the 1918
Finnish Civil War, which started as an offshoot of the Russian revolution, socialist insurgents
unsuccessfully fought conservative Senate-led forces over the control of the newly-independent
nation. The conflict lasted four months and resulted in about 39,000 casualties, three-fourths of
whom were insurgents. To match the insurgents to locations and to understand who joined the
conflict and the insurgency, we use a unique individual-level dataset that contains information on
all civil-war casualties, including their place of birth. Our data indicate that municipalities with a
preferred tenant farming contracts (Peltonen 1990; Peltonen 1992). Free movement of labor was banned until 1898
(Happonen 2004).
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higher inequality in the early 1900s (and those that had faced a greater famine shock fifty years
prior) experienced more insurgent deaths in 1918.4
After the conflict, inequality fell rapidly. We show that a key mechanism behind the sudden
decrease in inequality was the land reform enacted shortly after the conflict. We further argue
that extending the franchise played a critical role in keeping the peace. Until the late 1910s,
suffrage in Finnish local elections was highly restricted, and instead of following a “one man, one
vote” rule, the number of votes of each voter depended on the amount of taxes paid. This system
accumulated political power to the economic elites and completely excluded many citizens from
the electorate, limiting their chances of influencing, for instance, poor relief and health care.5 The
country introduced equal voting rights after the civil war with the first fully democratic municipal
election held merely a year after the conflict. We find that municipal spending policies reacted to
the larger and poorer electorate accordingly.
Taken together, these results clearly show that equality has not been a stable part of Finnish
history, that is, something inherent in its “Nordic values”. Instead, Finland has experienced both a
radical rise and a drastic fall of inequality. We emphasize and provide evidence that the famine of
1866-1868, the Civil War of 1918, and the following democratization and redistribution contributed
to these developments. However, we do not claim that these were the only factors contributing to
inequality—just that they had an impact. Altogether, the Finnish experience shows similarities
to multiple other settings. While taxation and redistribution are the most common tools in the
battle against inequality in present-day societies, many scholars argue that violent revolutions have
played an important role in shaping the distribution of prosperity and power historically (Acemoglu
and Robinson 2000; Wood 2003; Moore 2016; Scheidel 2018).6
With our novel data set and a within-country setting, we bring in new results and contribute
to several large debates in social sciences on the causes and consequences of inequality. First, we
provide novel evidence on the societal impacts of famines by investigating how labor shortages
4We further document evidence of non-violent expressions of discontent in the more affected municipalities before
the civil war. They voted more for the Social Democratic Party and had more workers’ association members.
5See also Bengtsson (2019) who describes economic inequality and political exclusion in Sweden around the same
time. The Swedish circumstances were very similar to those in Finland. Having weighted voting rights not unique
to the Nordic countries. For instance, a similar rule was used in Prussia (Becker and Hornung 2020). Furthermore,
franchise restrictions that were based on income were commonplace in many other parts of the world, such as the
United States (Keyssar 2009).
6In particular, Finland is not a unique case in that the height of its inequality coincides with social unrest and the
extension of the franchise. Our findings are in fact in tally with the seminal work by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000)
which establishes a potential link between democratization and the Kuznets curve:
Rising inequality often associated with industrialization increases social unrest and induces
democratization. Democratization in turn opens the way for redistribution and mass education, and
reduces inequality. Interestingly, in line with this approach, in a number of Western economies, the
peak of the Kuznets curve coincides with the extension of the franchise.
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affect economic activity and living standards under coercive labor market institutions. Earlier
work has explored the origins of labor market coercion. For instance, Naidu and Yuchtman (2013),
Bobonis and Morrow (2014), and Saleh (2020) find that export booms may tighten labor market
coercion. We complement this research by illustrating that a tightening labor coercion may also
stem from negative population shocks. These results are in line with a famous remark of Brenner
(1976), according to whom labor markets became more coercive in Eastern Europe after the Black
Death wiped out a significant share of the population. Another related strand of literature focuses
on the consequences of labor coercion, in particular, how it adversely affects various long-run
outcomes of countries (Dell 2010; Dell and Olken 2020; Nunn and Wantchekon 2011).
The aforementioned research also touches on our second contribution: we provide new
evidence on how inequality and labor coercion can trigger a civil conflict. The existing empirical
research on inequality and civil conflict offers mixed results, and much of the evidence comes
from analyses of cross-country data (Muller and Seligson 1987; Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004;
Nafziger and Auvinen 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Some closely related studies focus on the
relationship between land inequality and civil unrest. For example, Albertus et al. (2018) use
municipality-level data from Brazil’s extensive land reform program to study the conditional
relationship between landholding inequality and unrest.7 Being able to link greater economic
inequality with agricultural labor coercion (stemming from the famine) and strengthened political
exclusion, we can explore some potential mechanisms that could explain the connection between
inequality and conflict. Moreover, our data on the civil war casualties allow us to advance the
literature by going beyond the mere occurrence of conflict since we can measure participation and
the economic status of the participants. By focusing on institutional factors that contribute to the
emergence of a civil conflict, we complement work by authors such as Miguel et al. (2004) and
Dube and Vargas (2013) that focuses on the relationship between short-term shocks and conflict.
Third, our findings speak to theories of inequality and democratization. Prominent
redistributive theories of democratization proposed by Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson
(2000, 2006b) suggest a foundational link between democratization and inequality. In these
theories, the distribution of wealth shapes elites’ incentives to prevent or enable a more even
distribution of political power.8 Whereas Boix (2003) proposes a linear relationship between
inequality and democratization, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006b) theorize that
7Similarly, Hidalgo et al. (2010) study Brazilian municipalities. Their focus is on the economic predictors of
land invasions. They show that in highly unequal municipalities, negative income shocks cause twice as many land
invasions as in municipalities with average land inequality.
8The ideas regarding the connection between inequality and democracy are not new. They can be traced back
to great thinkers such as Aristotle, who wrote in The Politics that “where one set of people possesses a great deal
and the other nothing, the result is either extreme democracy or unmixed oligarchy, or tyranny due to the excesses
of either”—or Alexis de Tocqueville, who praised an “equality of conditions” as the most important precondition for
democracy in Democracy in America (1835).
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democratization often happens when an economy is at the peak of the Kuznets curve. Our
findings go hand-in-hand with the conjecture of Acemoglu and Robinson. Their threat of
revolution hypothesis suggests that extending the franchise can act as a commitment to future
redistribution, which again prevents future social unrest.
Previous studies—namely Przeworski (2009), Aidt and Jensen (2014), and Aidt and Franck
(2015)—have shown that the threat of revolution can catalyze the democratization process. Our
fourth contribution is to take this analysis a step further by showing that democratization induced
by a threat of revolution can also affect redistribution and inequality. Many historical studies
document a positive relationship between democracy and redistribution or the size of the public
sector (Husted and Kenny 1997; Lott and Kenny 1999; Aidt et al. 2006; Miller 2008). The link
between democratization and inequality has especially been studied by political scientists and
sociologists.9 In their survey, Scheve and Stasavage (2017) show that cross-country data do not
support the idea of democracy producing wealth equality. Acemoglu et al. (2015) document that,
in a panel of countries, democracy is positively associated with tax revenues as a fraction of GDP
as well as secondary school enrollment. The authors, however, find much more limited evidence
of an effect of democracy on inequality. They conclude that the literature is still inconclusive on
the impacts and hypothesize that the effects may depend on initial conditions. We offer an
empirical characterization of one case where economic equality and increased redistribution
followed the adoption of democratic institutions in the aftermath of a civil conflict.
In the following section, we discuss the historical background of our case through a
conceptual framework that links the events to trends in inequality. We also lay out empirically
testable hypotheses based on the existing literature. We then present our newly collected data and
our findings from the empirical investigation. Finally, we discuss some additional remarks, such
as alternative mechanisms that could drive the development of Finnish inequality, before
concluding.
2 Historical Background and Conceptual Framework
This section gives a brief overview of the historical background of our study. More precisely, we
discuss the famine of 1866-1868, the Civil War of 1918 and its aftermath, and how these events
impacted Finnish inequality. We connect these events to the related theoretical and empirical
literature and lay out empirical predictions that we can test with our data.
9Much of the existing research uses cross-country data, and especially the older research suffers from econometric
problems as pointed out by Acemoglu et al. (2015). For example, there is the possibility that omitted factors are
affecting both inequality and democracy, and that reverse causation from inequality to democracy may be present. Our
within-country setting is perhaps cleaner and less vulnerable to such concerns.
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2.1 Famine and Inequality
The famine of 1866-1868 originated from catastrophic weather conditions which caused severe
crop failures across the country. Due to excessive rain during the summer of 1866, root vegetables
rotted in the fields, and sowing rye became extremely difficult in the autumn.10 The rainy summer
and autumn were followed by a hard and long winter which severely affected the 1867 harvest in
large parts of the country.11 Overall, the harvest of rye was cut in half relative to previous years’
normal harvest (Panel A in Figure 2). While the weather and harvests returned back to normal by
1868, contagious diseases spread and killed thousands more (Turpeinen 1986).
The famine resulted in about 270,000 deaths. This was about 150,000 in excess relative to
the normal mortality, that is, almost 8% of the entire Finnish population (Panel C in Figure 2).
However, there was significant variation in the severity of famine deaths and crop failures across
the country that we will exploit in our empirical analyses. As shown in Panels C and D of Figure
2, areas in central and southern Finland were hit harder by the famine. In some heavily affected
municipalities, as much as one-third of the population died during the famine years. It is also clear
that excess deaths occur often in the same municipalities that experienced crop failures. Still, some
municipalities experienced large population shocks despite not having a crop failure, at least partly
due to contagious diseases that spread during the famine.
The famine induced a considerable decrease in labor supply. Not only did it impact the current
labor force: typical to famines, children were a particularly vulnerable group. This meant that the
availability of labor force was affected for an extended period of time. Now, for our analysis, it is
important to understand what happened in the labor markets, given the negative labor supply
shock? Standard economic theory would tend to suggest that if labor market institutions are
inclusive, negative supply shocks would increase workers’ bargaining power. As a consequence,
wages should increase and the income distribution become more equal., which This is, for
example, what seems to have happened in Western Europe after the Black Death in the
mid-1300s. The negative labor shock improved the living standards of workers.12 However, this
standard economic logic is not likely to apply in the presence of coercive labor markets which we
consider more descriptive of the Finnish labor markets in the era. In coercive labor markets, the
10Rye was the by far most important source of calories in Finland in the 1800s. However, also other, less important
types of crops such as barley were similarly affected by the poor weather conditions. We illustrate this in Appendix
Figure A1. Appendix Figure A2 shows that the output of other agricultural products was less affected but did not
increase either during the famine years.
11Turpeinen (1986) describes the weather conditions during the famine years in detail. Karadja and Prawitz (2019)
study the consequences of the same weather shock in Sweden. They show that emigration from Sweden to the United
States was greater in locations that were hit harder by the poor weather. A fundamental difference between Finland
and Sweden is that the significantly richer Sweden did not experience a famine.
12As discussed in Scheidel (2018), a key difference between famines and pandemics is that famines tend to have a
lower mortality.
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effects of a population decline depend on the market price of the output and workers’ outside
options (Domar 1970; Acemoglu and Wolitzky 2011). For example, in Acemoglu and Wolitzky’s
model of labor market coercion, labor scarcity can increase labor coercion if the market price of
the output increases but workers’ outside options do not. A prominent historical example
consitent with this view, as noted by Brenner (1976), is that labor coercion actually increased in
many parts of Eastern Europe after the population shock caused by the Black Death, leading to
the so-called Second Serfdom.
The Finnish labor market institutions at the time were coercive. A particular feature was the
prevalence of tenant farming, which was an essential part of rural labor markets in the late 19th
and early 20th century and which was among the most contentious policy issues in the public
debate. The number of tenant farms increased through the late 1800s and early 1900s, tenant farms
constituting nearly half of all farms in 1912.13 In many cases demand for farmable land was high
but no land was made available for sale, making tenant farming the only option (Peltonen 1990;
Peltonen 1992). While tenant farming was not serfdom, it was a coercive labor relationship as
the large land owners had significant power over their tenants.14 The tenant farmers paid their
rent mainly in day labor (taksvärkki), and paying a monetary rent was rare.15 Tenant farmers
seldom had written contracts, and the amount of day labor and contract termination was entirely
at the discretion of land owners. Particularly taxing was the land owners’ right to require extra
day labor (ylipäivät) and employing the tenant farmer’s family. Tenant farming also hindered the
emergence of the rural wage labor market as the land owners could use the tenant farmers as labor
(Peltonen 1990). Such monopsony power was arguably higher in locations with more concentrated
ownership of land.
The underlying conditions further bolstered tightening coercion in the Finnish labor markets.
The prices of agricultural products increased due to famine, and workers lacked outside options.
This latter point was because there were merely a few cities and little employment opportunities in
industrial production. Even when the country started industrializing eventually, pursuing outside
opportunities was difficult due to negative attitudes towards migration, low social mobility, and
various geographical mobility restrictions, such as passport requirements (Lento 1951). According
to the theory of Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2011), these factors would have allowed labor coercion
to increase. This would have introduced a downward pressure in wages, increased tenant farming,
13There were three broad types of tenants: lampuoti who rented an entire farm, torppari who rented a part of farm,
and mäkitupalainen who rented land to live on without any farmable land. The increase in tenant farming was mainly
driven by severe restrictions on land division and ownership in the 19th century. A landowner could only pass on
their property to a single descendant and while the others were forced to rent part of that land for themselves. As the
population grew, this resulted in the increase in tenant farming contracts.
14Naidu and Yuchtman (2013) discuss how such “intermediate” forms of labor coercion have been common.
15Monetization of the Finnish agriculture was slowly increasing through the 1800s. But still in the year 1912, 72%
of the tenant farmers paid their rent in day labor according to the land rent statistics of Statistics Finland.
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and potentially increased economic inequality. At the same time, those with enough land to be net
producers would have gained from higher food prices (see also Ravallion 1997 and the references
therein).
Furthermore, land ownership became increasingly concentrated after the famine. In particular,
many households were either forced to sell their farms and other property to feed their family,
abandon their homes to find food elsewhere, or their farms had to be auctioned off to pay off debts
accumulated during these successive bad harvest years (Häkkinen et al. 1991). This mechanism
is well illustrated by Dr. Edvard Gylling who writes in the Workers’ Almanac of 1918 (Gylling
1917):
Wheat was largely bought with debt money. Farms and houses were used as a
collateral. When the famine continued, farmers could not pay back their debts. On
the contrary, new debt would have been needed. Payments were dunned despite the
extreme distress. [...] Hundreds and thousands of houses were foreclosed because of
even small debts, unpaid rents, or unpaid taxes. [...] Many farms changed hands, and
ownership became more concentrated than before.
As the banks refused to lend during the extreme situation, the largest land owners and
speculators with liquid wealth were able to increase their holdings more in municipalities which
were hit harder by the famine.16 The concentration of land ownership and the prevalence of
tenant farming interacted in potentially significant ways, increasing inequality and labor coercion
in the early 1900s.17
Based on the characteristics of the Finnish labor markets and the theoretical predictions
discussed above, we make two empirically testable claims regarding the effects of the famine of
1866-1868 on inequality and labor coercion:
Claim 1. The famine caused a persistent increase in inequality.
Claim 2. There was more labor coercion in locations that were hit harder by the
famine.
16Using data on the universe of Finnish newspapers, we provide descriptive evidence which is consistent with
this mechanism. Appendix Figure A3 shows that there were much more newspaper mentions of bankruptcy and
auctions after the famine. The share of pages containing hits for bankruptcy and auction increased five and two fold,
respectively. We also find evidence suggesting that a gap in advertisements on sales and purchases emerges around the
famine years.
17An additional reason why the famine may have shaped inequality in the long run is that exposure to famine
at young ages shapes adult health and labor market outcomes. These further influence the same outcomes of future
offspring. For instance, Meng and Qian (2011) provide empirical evidence of the long-run impacts of China’s Great
Famine. They argue that famine affects long-run development outcomes through two main channels: by adversely
affecting childhood health, or by reducing the quality or quantity of investment into children by deteriorating their
parents’ health. If the impacts are differential by parental socio-economic background, this could also contribute to
increases in inequality.
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2.2 Inequality and Civil Conflict
We propose that the famine of 1866-1868 contributed to the emergence of the Finnish Civil War
of 1918 by boosting economic inequalities and political exclusion in society. The civil war was a
conflict for the control of Finland following its declaration of independence from Russia.18 In
1917, the February Revolution dethroned Czar Nicholas II, and the political power over the Grand
Duchy of Finland was handed over to the weak Finnish Parliament. This transition created a
power vacuum both politically and in law enforcement, as the Russian-backed police were
dissolved. Simultaneously, both the bourgeois elite and the working class began to organize their
own security guards. There were frequent strikes and demonstrations across the country
demanding better working conditions, land reform, and an extension of the franchise. While the
conservative government had made significant concessions by November, the conflict had already
escalated to the point where both sides had started arming their forces, and the revolution attempt
was on its way.
The social backgrounds of their members distinguished the two sides of the civil conflict. The
Red Guards were led by a section of the Social Democratic Party, and they mainly consisted of
industrial and agricultural workers. Soviet Russia provided the Red Guard with arms, and many
Russians also fought along with the Reds. The insurgents controlled most of Southern Finland and
many of its industrial centers. The conservative Senate led the White Guards, and also supported
by the German Imperial Army. The Whites were mostly volunteering members of the middle and
upper social classes, but they also organized a draft in their controlled areas during the war. The
hostilities of 1918 lasted for about four months, from late January until mid-May. In total, about
39,000 people died, and most of the casualties were insurgents. Many of these casualties were not
battle deaths but either executed or died of diseases in prison camps after the war.
Economists and political scientists have established that economic underdevelopment and
poverty are important predictors of civil conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Fearon and
Laitin 2003; Miguel et al. 2004; Blattman and Miguel 2010). In discontent theories of conflict,
economic inequality is considered to be among the fundamental economic preconditions of
insurgency and revolution (Huntington 1968; Paige 1975; Muller and Seligson 1987; Midlarsky
1988). While the first notion has strong support in the data, the empirical support for the latter is
more mixed (Muller and Seligson 1987; Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Nafziger and Auvinen
18See Alapuro (1988) and Upton (1980) for more in-depth accounts of the civil war.
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2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003).19 We present the geographical distribution of insurgency, based
on insurgent casualties’ place of birth, alongside with pre-conflict inequality in Figure 3.
In our context, economic inequality also directly translates to political inequality. A universal
suffrage was adopted in the national elections already in 1906, but the voting rights in municipal
elections were still tied to income. In most municipalities, voters would get one vote for every
100 Marks of taxes paid. Individual voting power was capped at 1/6 of the total municipality
votes. Only about one fifth of the working-age population paid enough local taxes to be granted
voting rights.20 A large share of the working class was not allowed to vote and was left without
representation in many municipalities. For example, Hjerppe and Lefgren (1974) suggest that 70
percent of the population did not pay a minimum amount of taxes to be eligible to vote in the early
1900s.21 Their chances of influencing policies decided at the municipal level—poor relief, taking
care of unemployment, public safety, primary education, primary health care, and so forth—were
extremely limited.
The scholarship on inequality sometimes argues that simple economic inequalities between the
rich and the poor may not be enough to trigger a civil war. What might be more provoking is so-
called horizontal inequality, i.e., power and resources being unequally distributed between groups
that are different also in other characteristics. The political exclusion of the working classes in the
pre-civil war Finland is one example of such an inequality that could have served as a catalyst for
the civil conflict (Østby 2008; Buhaug et al. 2008; Wimmer et al. 2009).
We illustrate the political inequality in local elections in Figure 4. Panel A shows the amount of
people in each tax bracket, and the relative weight of that group in local decision making. Note first
that a large share of the population did not pay any taxes and were not allowed to vote. However,
we also see that the much smaller high-income groups have nearly the same vote share as the much
larger lower-income groups. In Panel B, we present the inequality in vote weights across the tax
brackets. Assuming that the cap on individual voting power was not binding, the vote of a person
19Scholars such as Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004) link the emergence of rebellion to the availability of financing
and potential recruits. Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that grievances alone are not enough to generate political
violence. Their central thesis is that civil wars happen in “fragile states with limited administrative control of their
peripheries”. These arguments align with early theoretical work by sociologists such as Tilly (1978) and Skocpol
(1979). For further discussion, see also Boix (2008).
20The unit of taxation was the household, meaning that a larger part of the population was actually taxed.
21In an essay from 1932, future Finnish President Urho Kekkonen describes the municipal voting rights before
universal suffrage as follows:
[...] only a handful of municipality’s wealthiest citizens became elected, and it could even be the
case that the richest few percent could overrule everyone else in this voting system. Participation in
municipal decision-making was the right of merely a few, and working and middle class members in
the countryside and cities had no way of influencing municipal policy-making. The public opinion was
strictly against voting rights based on income for a good reason [...]
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in the highest income bracket would have weighed 800 times the vote of a person in the lowest
income bracket, for example.
Taking these arguments together, we make the following claim regarding the correlational
relationship between inequality and insurgency, and the reduced-form effect of the famine on
insurgency:
Claim 3. Insurgency was higher in locations with more inequality, and in locations
that were hit harder by the famine.
2.3 Conflict and Redistribution
After the civil war, there were important policy changes that affected both political and economic
inequality. In particular, the central government implemented a major electoral reform that
established universal suffrage in municipal elections. The law was passed in the parliament after
the declaration of independence, some months before the conflict onset in late 1917, and after
years of debate in the parliament and significant resistance from the elite and landowners. In
practice, however, municipal elections with universal suffrage were not organized until after the
conflict.22
Why did the winning side of the conflict decide to carry out a reform that especially benefited
the losing side? The threat of revolution hypothesis put forward by Acemoglu and Robinson
(2000) suggests that extending the franchise can act as a commitment to future redistribution to
prevent social unrest. Extended suffrage will eventually result in increased redistribution and
schooling, and consequently lower inequality.23 The ruling elites may also have to resort to
full-scale democratization since lesser concessions might be viewed as a sign of weakness which
could lead to further unrest (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006a). Przeworski (2009), Aidt and Jensen
(2014), and Aidt and Franck (2015) provide empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis. In
22There had been several attempts to reform the franchise already before Finland’s independence of Russia (see,
e.g., Mylly 2006). The Finnish Parliament first voted in favor of universal suffrage in municipal elections in the year
1906. The Senate was strongly against this, and described the new legislation as “unfair”. It took until the year 1914
before the legislation was brought to the Russian emperor to be ratified which he did not do in the end. Right before
Finland’s independence in the year 1917, the Parliament again voted in favor of universal suffrage. This legislation
was not ratified by the provisional government of Russia. Once Finland became independent of Russia, the constraint
of having to have legislation accepted by Russia naturally ceased to exist.
23Acemoglu and Robinson (2006b) present case studies that follow such patterns. For example, in Germany, the
United Kingdom, and France, franchise reforms were preceded by increasing inequality. This eventually led to social
unrest and then to direct or indirect democratization. Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) construct a model that generates
a similar pattern. In their model, the governing elite can subsidize the education of the non-educated. This has positive
externalities but it comes at a cost of losing political control to the newly educated citizens. In their model, a partial
investment in schooling is linked to an increase in inequality. With partial democratization there is little redistribution.
But when more individuals get educated and the elite sees its political power diluted to the now larger voting group,
they vote for further redistribution which yields a reduction in inequality.
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related work, Weingast (1997) and Wantchekon and Neeman (2002) construct formal arguments
that it might not be until a civil conflict escalates that the elites concede to democratize.
The first democratic municipal elections with universal suffrage were held only half a year
after the civil war. The reform extended municipal voting rights to some of those who fought with
the government forces, but the poorer insurgent side was undoubtedly most affected. The final
question that this paper seeks to answer is how this affected real outcomes.
The Meltzer and Richard (1981) model predicts that extending political power to poorer
segments of society leads to more redistribution and less inequality.24 But in general, democracy
may not always change fiscal policy and the distribution of income. Counteracting forces such as
the capture of democracy (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008; Acemoglu et al. 2013; Acemoglu et al.
2013) or a middle-class bias (Acemoglu et al. 2015) may also play an important role.25 However,
in Finland in 1918, the conditions were ripe for changes—and the overall consensus was that
changes were needed to prevent a new conflict from emerging. After the civil war and franchise
extension, previously unrepresented segments of society gained political representation in local
governments. Decisions in local councils were made by a two-third supermajority, which would
have made capture more costly. The conservatives, who typically represented the land owners and
other members of upper social classes, rarely had enough seats to get decisions through on their
own. This served as a catalyst for collaboration between the conservatives and the left (Kettunen
1986; Aatsinki 2009; Lintunen 2017).
A particularly important form of redistribution was the large land reform implemented after
the civil war (Jörgensen 2006). Legislation passed in the year 1918 made it possible for the tenant
farmers to buy the land they were renting at a discounted price. Four years later in 1922, the
Parliament approved the Act on the acquisition of land for settlement purposes (278/1922) that
gave the state and local authorities the right to facilitate the acquisition of land for citizens for
cultivation and residential settlement. The government could redeem fractions of larger farms and
redistribute the land to individuals who did not own any land before, but still had the knowledge
and resources to start practicing agriculture on the newly acquired land. The local governments
had significant discretion in how the land was reallocated.
24For empirical evidence that franchise extension leads to changes in public policies, see for example Husted and
Kenny (1997), Lott and Kenny (1999), and Miller (2008). On the other hand, Mulligan et al. (2004) offer cross-country
evidence suggesting that democracies and non-democracies are not that different in terms of their economic policies.
Similarly, Castañeda Dower et al. (2018) find little evidence of more redistribution after increased representation of
peasants in Imperial Russia.
25If the democracy is captured, rich segments of society can take other actions to offset the reallocation of power
by increasing their de facto power. For example, they could try to control the political agenda of parties by lobbying or
repression. Second, early franchise reforms often also gave voting rights to many members of the middle classes. It is
possible that the middle class could then have used its power to tax the poor and redistribute to itself. The implications
for inequality are ambiguous in a simple median-voter framework discussed by Acemoglu et al. (2015).
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Our final claim concerns the evolution of inequality and redistribution after franchise extension.
As before, we consider the relationship between the famine and changes in redistribution and
inequality causal. The other relationships are correlational, but we believe that they are likely
mechanisms through which the famine could matter for later outcomes.
Claim 4. Inequality decreased and redistribution increased more in locations that were
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Panel D: Rye harvest failure 1867
Figure 2. Geographical distribution of famine exposure.
Notes: Panel A shows rye production in Finland as documented in Viita (1965). Panel B shows the
Finnish population between 1860-1890 and a linear prediction based on the prior four decades of
population growth. The population decrease was 7.8% during the famine years 1866-1868 relative
to the predicted population. Panel C plots the famine casualties relative to the 1865 population in
each municipality. The map in Panel D plots the geographical distribution of the severity of rye
harvest failure. A higher number reflects a poorer harvest. We construct this measure based on the
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Panel B: Insurgency deaths 1918
Figure 3. Geographical distribution of pre-civil war inequality and insurgent deaths.
Notes: The map in Panel A shows income inequality in 1904 in each municipality. The map in
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Panel B: Income bracket voting power relative to bottom bracket
Figure 4. Taxable income and voting power in local elections
Notes: Panel A plots the share of the population and the vote share of each income bracket in 1904.




We have collected and digitized an extensive amount of historical data to test whether our claims
have empirical support. This section discusses these data and their sources. We also assess the
exogeneity of the famine exposure, as this will be crucial for our empirical investigation.
3.1 Main Variables
We start by characterizing our main dependent and independent variables. Summary statistics on
the data that we use in our main analyses are presented in Table 1.
Exposure to the Famine We construct two measures to capture the geographical variation in
exposure to the famine. Our first measure is the number of deaths between 1866 and 1868 relative
to the 1865 population. The number of deaths in each municipality is documented in the Official
Statistics of Finland publication Syntyneet, vihityt ja kuolleet vuosina 1865-1868 from the year
1871. On average, around 15% of population died between these years.26 We consider the famine
deaths to serve as a proxy for the local severity of the famine shock, including economic and social
hardship and not only the demographic change. Second, we use information on the quality of the
1867 rye harvest from Hirvonen (2013). These data were originally collected for reports sent to
the Russian Finance Ministry by regional governors of Finland. Hirvonen (2013) quantifies the
information in the reports on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 corresponds to a complete crop failure,
and 5 corresponds to a good harvest. We create an indicator variable for a crop failure using
these data. It gets the value 1 if a municipality had a crop failure in 1867, and it is equal to 0
otherwise.27 Overall, a striking 35% of the municipalities covered in our data experienced a crop
failure in 1867.28
Inequality Measures To measure both economic and political inequality, we use extensive data
on taxes and land ownership. First, we use the Official Statistics of Finland tables on taxes for the
years 1865, 1881, 1932, 1935, and 1938 to measure income inequality in each municipality. These
statistical tables include the number of people in each income bracket in a given municipality
26This figure is larger than the 8% reported by, e.g., Turpeinen (1986). This is because our measure includes all
deaths during the period, instead of capturing only excess mortality.
27Municipalities can have multiple reports for the year 1867. We take the average of these reports and consider
any value below 2 as a crop failure. In that case, at least one report must have stated that a municipality experienced a
complete crop failure (value 1).
28As we discussed earlier, the main reason for the famine were poor weather conditions. Finland had only two
weather stations in 1867, so measuring weather shocks credibly at the municipal level is not possible.
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which allows us to estimate a Gini coefficient for each municipality.29 While Statistics Finland
did not publish any data on income and property between 1881-1920, we are able to estimate
income inequality closer to the 1918 civil war by using municipal income tax statistics drawn
from Hjelt and Broms (1904). These municipal income statistics are also binned by income group,
which allows a consistent estimation of the Gini coefficients. The Hjelt and Broms data only
include information on rural municipalities. On average, the income Gini was 0.50 in 1904, and
the average change between the years 1904-1938 was −0.25. Given that Finland at the time relied
heavily on agriculture, much of the income inequality was closely linked with land inequality.
As an alternative measure of inequality measured slightly closer to the conflict, we estimate land
inequality for each municipality using farm size information from the 1910 Finnish Agricultural
Census. The Gini coefficient for land ownership averaged at 0.39 in 1910.
Labor Coercion Outcomes We measure the extent of labor market coercion in the Finnish rural
municipalities by using the information on the share of tenant farmers, the share of terminated
tenant contracts, and daily agricultural wages. Tenant farming was a prevalent form of farming,
and the lack of land ownership is often attributed as a sign of labor coercion as discussed above. In
our data, 45% of all farms were tenant farms. These data come from the 1910 Finnish Agricultural
Census. Frequently, the quality of land given to the tenant farmers was poor and making the land
suitable for cultivation required additional work and effort. Historical accounts suggests that land
owners sometimes terminated tenant farmers’ contracts after they had put lots of effort into turning
their rental land productive (Rasila 1970). We thus also measure agricultural labor coercion by the
amount of terminated tenant leases. The amount of terminated tenant leases in each municipality
comes from Haataja (1916). We scale the number of terminated contracts by all farms in 1910. The
resulting variable averages at 4 percent. We also collect information on the average daily wages
paid to farm laborers. These are available in Statistics Finland’s publication on farming and animal
husbandry in the year 1908. We use the daily male wage during the summer as a proxy for farm
labor wages. On average, this wage was 3.07 Finnish Marks.30
Insurgency Participation We use a unique dataset of all Finnish Civil War casualties, collected
by the Finnish government in the Suomen sotasurmat 1914-22 project, to approximate Civil War
participation. These data include the side of the conflict (Red or White), the occupation, and
the municipality of birth of each individual who died in the civil war. There are about 39,550
29The income statistics are binned by tax groups and a large part of the population did not pay any taxes. We
estimate the Gini coefficient using a robust Pareto midpoint estimator suggested by von Hippel et al. (2016) which
takes into account the binned nature of the data and the open-ended largest tax bracket. This implementation is
available in the rpme package in Stata. Alternative metrics for income inequality are highly correlated with the Gini
coefficient for the years for which we can measure them (see Appendix B).
30One Finnish Mark in 1908 is roughly equal to four U.S. dollars today.
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individuals in the dataset.31 Since the database separates the casualties by the side, we can use the
revolutionary side deaths as a precise measure of insurgency participation. We use the municipality
of birth of the insurgents to calculate the number of causalities in each municipality and divide this
number by the municipal male population in 1910 to obtain the insurgent death rate. Using the
municipality of birth allows us to capture also those rural workers who migrated to the cities before
the civil war. On average, 2% of the male population died in the conflict. As the majority of the
insurgency casualties documented in the dataset occurred in prison camps after the cease fire, and
as we are using the municipality of birth rather than the municipality of residence, the casualties
capture the local insurgency participation more broadly and not only the severity of local battles.32
Redistribution We measure redistribution after the conflict using information on the inter-war
land reform, and Statistics Finland’s statistics on municipal spending. The land reform data are
taken from Statistics Finland’s land survey for the years 1919-1923. This publication includes a
statistical map of new farms created in the land reform in each municipality. We have digitized
and georeferenced the contents of this map and measure the land reform intensity by the number
of new farms created by the land reform during the years 1919-1923, relative to the total number
of farms in 1910. For public spending, we have gathered the information for the years 1912 and
1932. 1912 is the earliest available information about municipal spending, and 1932 is the first
year after the civil war when we can measure spending. These publications report how much
each municipal government spent on poor relief, health care, and schooling, and thus they cover
the main redistributive policies of local governments. Spending in these areas did not rely on the
national budget, and decisions on the policies were entirely up to the municipal governments. We
scale the spending variables by population and take logarithms. Our main variable of interest is
the change in (log) per capita spending in a given municipality between 1912 and 1932.
Covariates Finally, we use an extensive set of covariates to capture potentially important
differences in municipal labor markets and other characteristics. In particular, we have collected
information on population in 1865 from Statistics Finland’s publication Suomen väestö joulukuun
31 p:nä 1865. We measure the soil suitability for different crops in each municipality using data
from the Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) database.33 We also use information on terrain
slope taken from the same database. Finally, our econometric analyses also control for the latitude
and longitude of the centroid of each municipality.
31The Finnish National Archive has made these data publicly available online at http://vesta.narc.fi/
cgi-bin/db2www/sotasurmaetusivu/main (accessed May 31, 2019).
32Most active insurgents were imprisoned even though not all were eventually sentenced. The majority of the
prisoners died of diseases such as the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic.
33We take a logarithm of crop suitability without adding a constant to zeros. This means that areas that are not
suitable for cultivation are left out of our analyses.
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Table 1. Summary statistics.
N Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Famine
Famine deaths 1866-1868 409 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.34
Crop failure 1867 334 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00
Grievances
Income Gini 1904 451 0.50 0.09 0.25 0.87
Land Gini 1910 442 0.39 0.08 0.15 0.70
Tenant farm share 442 0.46 0.24 0.00 0.95
Terminated lease share 429 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.30
Daily wage 1908 422 3.07 0.58 2.00 5.00
Civil war
Insurgency per capita 450 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.10
Redistribution outcomes
∆ Gini 1904-1938 444 -0.25 0.09 -0.62 0.28
Land reform share 437 0.27 0.19 0.00 0.86
∆ Welfare spending 1912-1938 438 3.24 0.41 2.05 4.64
∆ School spending 1912-1938 436 1.87 0.42 0.38 3.24
∆ Health spending 1912-1938 434 3.78 0.80 1.73 5.97
3.2 Pre-Famine Characteristics
Before proceeding to the main analysis, we study whether the municipalities that were more
exposed to the famine were somehow different from those that were less affected already before
the famine. Table 2 describes the various pre-famine characteristics of municipalities. First, we
report the means and standard deviations of the pre-determined covariates in column (1). Column
(2) presents regression coefficients (and corresponding standard errors) from univariate
regressions where we regress pre-famine characteristics one by one on the population share of
famine deaths. We see that there are some potentially important pre-existing differences. For
example, municipalities that experienced more deaths were, on average, more populous, poorer,
located in particular parts of the country, and less suitable for barley and rye farming. These
associations suggest that it is important to control for these characteristics in the empirical
analysis.
Next, columns (3)-(5) compare municipalities by their crop failure status. According to our
classification, 112 municipalities in our data experienced a crop failure, and 223 did not. Columns
(3) and (4) present the means (and standard deviations) of our covariates for these two groups.
We compare the means in the groups by regressing each covariate on the crop failure dummy.
We condition these comparisons on the suitability for rye cultivation. The logic behind this is
that many locations were less suitable for rye cultivation and frequently experienced crop failures.
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Ideally, we would like to capture an exogenous shock. As we do not have any baseline trends
available, we proxy the commonness of crop failures by controlling for the general suitability for
rye cultivation. Even after adjusting for rye suitability, we see that crop failure captures something
meaningful in terms of famine exposure. Overall, we find municipalities that experienced a crop
failure had a significantly higher death rate during the famine years. The difference is around
4 percentage points which is about half of the excess mortality observed at the national level.
In contrast, we do not detect any statistically significant differences in pre-famine characteristics
between municipalities that experienced a crop failure and those that did not. While none of the
individual differences are statistically significant, the F-statistic for the test of joint significance
of the differences in column (5) is 1.07. Therefore, we fail to reject the hypothesis that crop
failures are uncorrelated with pre-famine characteristics (p = 0.39). This provides support for our
empirical strategy.
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Table 2. Famine deaths and pre-famine municipal characteristics.
Mean β Famine deaths No failure Crop failure βCrop f ailure Observations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Famine deaths 1866-1868 0.15 0.14 0.18 0.04*** 409
[0.05] [0.04] [0.04] (0.01)
log(Population 1865) 8.06 0.19** 8.24 8.17 -0.10 420
[0.74] (0.08) [0.69] [0.60] (0.08)
Pop. density 1865 1.57 0.02 1.73 1.84 0.07 420
[1.92] (0.15) [2.01] [2.18] (0.28)
Rainfall 5.96 -0.09** 6.07 5.92 -0.04 451
[0.42] (0.05) [0.38] [0.34] (0.06)
ln(Slope) 9.00 0.01 8.99 8.99 0.00 451
[0.08] (0.01) [0.08] [0.08] (0.01)
Income Gini 1865 0.31 -0.03** 0.32 0.30 -0.00 349
[0.12] (0.01) [0.11] [0.10] (0.01)
Mean income 1865 14.40 -2.69** 14.26 13.51 -0.22 349
[6.58] (1.05) [5.99] [4.24] (0.64)
ln(Dist. to Helsinki) 5.39 0.13** 5.24 5.57 0.07 451
[0.65] (0.05) [0.65] [0.57] (0.10)
ln(Dist. to Turku) 5.26 0.17** 5.14 5.56 0.15 451
[0.91] (0.08) [0.94] [0.57] (0.11)
Latitude 61.98 0.75*** 61.51 62.53 0.30 451
[1.49] (0.15) [1.30] [1.14] (0.22)
Longitude 24.80 -0.33 25.01 25.17 -0.05 451
[2.70] (0.28) [2.88] [2.70] (0.32)
ln(Barley suitability) 8.23 -0.24*** 8.39 8.00 -0.00 451
[0.57] (0.05) [0.61] [0.40] (0.00)
ln(Cereal suitability) 7.70 -0.01 7.77 7.69 0.02 450
[0.31] (0.03) [0.33] [0.26] (0.03)
ln(Rye suitability) 6.62 -0.22*** 6.79 6.39 451
[0.57] (0.05) [0.61] [0.41]
Notes: Column (1) shows the mean of famine deaths and other pre-famine characteristics across
municipalities. Column (2) shows the correlation between famine deaths and pre-famine characteristics.
Columns (3) and (4) show the famine deaths and pre-famine characteristics by the occurrence of crop
failure in 1867. Column (5) shows the correlation of famine deaths and pre-treatment characteristics with
crop failure, conditional on rye suitability. Standard deviations and robust standard errors are reported in




This section presents the main results. We first study the effects of the famine shock on inequality
and labor coercion in the long run. Then, we proceed to analyze how these factors influenced
participation in the Finnish Civil War. We conclude our main analyses by examining changes in
inequality and redistribution after the conflict and the subsequent adoption of democratic local
government institutions.
4.1 Persistent Effects of Famine on Inequality and Labor Coercion
Evolution of Inequality We begin our empirical investigation by showing the dynamic
relationship between inequality and the famine of 1866-1868. To do so, we estimate an
event-study specification of the form:
Ginimt = ∑
s 6=1865
δs (Famine exposurem×1(t = s))+λm +λt +ηmt , (1)
where Ginimt is income inequality in municipality m in the year t, and Famine exposurem is either
the death rate during the famine years or a dummy for a crop failure in 1867. λt and λm are the
county-specific year and municipality fixed effects, respectively, and ηmt is the error term. δt are
year-specific coefficients that we plot in Figure 5, setting 1865 as the base year. We present more
detailed regression results from the event-study specification in Appendix Table C1. We cluster the
standard errors at the municipal level. We include our baseline controls (rye suitability, latitude,
longitude, the logarithm of the population in 1865, and land ruggedness) interacted with year fixed
effects.34
The pattern of the event-study estimates shows that the famine caused an inverted U-shaped
response in Finnish inequality, where the turning point appears after the 1918 Civil War and after
the extension of the franchise. Panel A of Figure 5 illustrates that inequality was first increasing
more in areas with more deaths during the famine years. Furthermore, inequality also decreased
the most in these areas after the Civil War of 1918 was over. The estimated impact of famine deaths
on inequality in 1904, relative to the base-year 1865, is 0.533. This means that a one-standard-
deviation increase in the famine severity is associated with approximately a 0.027 point increase
in the Gini index. Panel B shows a similar relationship between inequality and the crop failure in
1867, with a crop failure causing a 0.031 points higher change in inequality. We can reject the
34We choose these baseline controls to maximize the number of observations that we have available for our
estimations, including the subsequent analyses. The results that are reported in this paper are robust to alternative
sets of control variables.
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hypothesis that δ1904 = δ1931 for both measures, meaning that inequality declined more in areas









































































Panel B: Crop failure and inequality
Figure 5. Event-study estimates.
Notes: The figures plot the raw differences from an event-study specification and their 95%
confidence intervals that are constructed using standard errors clustered at the municipality level.
We use 1865 as the base year. Estimations include county fixed effects and baseline controls
interacted with year fixed effects. The first two vertical lines mark the famine years, and the third
line shows the civil war year.
Effect of the Famine on Inequality and Labor Coercion before the Civil War of 1918 We
continue our empirical investigation by showing that the famine of 1868 was associated with higher
inequality and worse labor market outcomes in the early 1900s. Our main specification takes the
form
Grievancem = α +βFamine exposurem +X ′mγ + εm (2)
where Grievancem is a grievance outcome in municipality m, measured by income inequality,
inequality in land ownership, tenant farmer share, terminated contract share, or daily wage.
Famine exposurem is again either the death rate during the famine years or an indicator for a crop
failure in 1867, X ′m is a vector of controls, and εm is an error term. The coefficient of our interest
is β which captures the effect of the famine shock on the grievance outcome. All our
specifications include a set of baseline control variables. We also report results from a
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specification that is augmented with county (lääni) fixed effects to control for any unobservable
region-specific attributes. During the period of our study, there were eight counties.35 We use
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors throughout the paper, although we also report Conley
(1999) standard errors that correct for possible spatial autocorrelation among municipalities
within 50 kilometers of each other. These two standard errors are similar.
We first look at the effects of the famine on income and land inequality. Panel A of Table 3
shows our estimates of the effect of the famine on the Gini coefficient for income inequality in
1904. These results corroborate our event-study findings in Figure 5. Panel B reports estimates
for land inequality in 1910. When we control for region fixed effects, the estimates for the famine
severity are 0.214 for income inequality (Panel A, column 2) and 0.239 for land inequality (Panel
B, column 2). This means that a negative population shock equal to one standard deviation (or 5%
of the population) is associated with an increase of about 0.01 in both income and land inequality.
In columns (3) and (4), we report the direct impact of the 1867 crop failure on the inequality
outcomes. The results from regressions that control for county fixed effects suggest that
experiencing the crop failure increased the income Gini coefficient by 0.022 points and the land
Gini coefficient by 0.020 points. These point estimates are statistically significant across
specifications and economically meaningful, but not very large relative to the means of 0.51
(income Gini) and 0.40 (land Gini).36
In Table 4, we study how the famine shock affected labor markets in the early 1900s. We
find that greater famine exposure increased the share of tenant farms substantially (Panel A). The
OLS estimate reported in column (2) is 1.107. This estimate means that a one-standard-deviation
increase in famine severity is associated with a 0.055 higher tenant farmer share in 1910. This
is a significant shift also relative to the mean of 0.47. Column (4) shows that the impact of a
crop failure is 0.058. We find less strong evidence on other measures of labor coercion. For
instance, the statistically non-significant impact of a crop failure on the share of terminated leases
is around 0.002, the average share being about 5%. The daily wage of workers was about 0.085
Finnish Marks lower in locations that experienced a crop failure. This effects is relatively small
compared to the average daily wage which was about three Finnish Marks. Furthermore, the most
conservative estimates with county fixed effects are not statistically significant at any conventional
levels. The results on wages are robust to scaling the daily wages by land prices (hectares per
100 Finnish Marks). Running a regression with the full set of controls yields a point estimate of
35Appendix Tables C2-C6 document that all our main results are robust to including all the predetermined
covariates that we observe as control variables in our regressions (see Table 2). However, this considerably cuts
down the number of observations that we have available. Our results are also robust to an approach that uses the crop
failure indicator as an instrumental variable for famine deaths. We refer to Appendix Tables C7-C11 and the associated
discussion for further information.
36In the supplementary materials, we show that all our results for the crop failures are robust to using a
randomization inference approach (see Appendix Figure C1).
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−5.898 (p = 0.003) for famine deaths per capita, and a point estimate of −0.395 (p = 0.056) for
crop failure.
We interpret these results as evidence of an increase in labor coercion. This interpretation aligns
with previous work by, for example, Naidu (2010), Naidu and Yuchtman (2013), and Tyrefors
Hinnerich et al. (2017) in other historical contexts. As we discussed earlier, our results go against
the standard economic logic in which negative labor supply shocks would improve bargaining
position of the working class. In our case, the rising inequality interacted with coercive rural labor
market institutions, and this resulted in even worse conditions for the agricultural workers.
Table 3. Famine and inequality in the early 1900s.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Income Gini 1904
Famine deaths per capita 0.315*** 0.214**
(0.086) (0.085)
Crop failure 0.022** 0.022**
(0.010) (0.011)
Conley SE 0.106 0.110 0.012 0.011
N 409 409 328 328
R2 0.212 0.287 0.138 0.233
Outcome mean 0.496 0.496 0.507 0.507
Panel B: Land Gini 1910
Famine deaths per capita 0.252*** 0.239***
(0.075) (0.079)
Crop failure 0.022*** 0.020**
(0.008) (0.008)
Conley SE 0.089 0.083 0.009 0.009
N 403 403 324 324
R2 0.132 0.225 0.133 0.212
Outcome mean 0.392 0.392 0.396 0.396
Controls
County FE
Notes: Baseline controls included in all estimations are latitude,
longitude, log suitability for rye, log suitability for barley, log elevation,
and log population in 1865. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Conley standard errors allow for spatial autocorrelation
among municipalities that are within 50 kilometers of each other. ***,
** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
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Table 4. Famine and labor coercion in the early 1900s.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Tenant farm share
Famine deaths per capita 1.359*** 1.107***
(0.195) (0.171)
Crop failure 0.087*** 0.058***
(0.024) (0.021)
Conley SE 0.312 0.295 0.029 0.024
N 403 403 324 324
R2 0.382 0.560 0.415 0.594
Outcome mean 0.464 0.464 0.468 0.468
Panel B: Terminated leases share
Famine deaths per capita 0.073 0.039
(0.056) (0.058)
Crop failure 0.008 0.002
(0.006) (0.006)
Conley SE 0.064 0.058 0.007 0.006
N 390 390 314 314
R2 0.269 0.326 0.248 0.317
Outcome mean 0.046 0.046 0.048 0.048
Panel C: Daily wage
Famine deaths per capita -4.105*** -3.473***
(0.612) (0.626)
Crop failure -0.204*** -0.085
(0.078) (0.072)
Conley SE 0.697 0.633 0.086 0.080
N 382 382 306 306
R2 0.279 0.389 0.146 0.275
Outcome mean 3.076 3.076 3.011 3.011
Controls
County FE
Notes: Baseline controls included in all estimations are latitude, longitude, log
suitability for rye, log suitability for barley, log elevation, and log population in
1865. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Conley standard errors
allow for spatial autocorrelation among municipalities that are within 50 kilometers
of each other. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
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4.2 Determinants of Insurgency Participation
Explaining Civil War Participation Next, we turn to the effects of the the famine on
insurgency in 1918, proxied by the insurgency casualty rate. Panel A Table 5 reports our
estimates on determinants of insurgency participation. It shows that municipalities that were more
severely affected by the famine experienced more insurgent deaths in the 1918 Civil War. The
regression results for famine deaths per capita reported in column (1) and (2) suggest that an
increase of one standard deviation in famine deaths is associated with 0.003− 0.005 more per
capita insurgent deaths, respectively. The magnitude of these estimates is meaningful compared
to the mean of 0.016. The results in columns (3) and (4) imply that experiencing a crop failure in
1867 resulted in 0.004 more insurgent deaths per capita. The size of the effect is again
considerable relative to the mean, about one quarter. The last two columns in Table 5 look at the
correlation between income inequality in the early 1900s and insurgency. It is possible that the
famine affected insurgency through its effect on inequality which we demonstrated in the
previous section. When we include all control variables, we see that increasing inequality by one
standard deviation is also associated with about 0.004 more per capita deaths. The findings are
robust to including different control variables, to using the logarithm of the dependent variable,
and to a randomization inference approach. Therefore, our results supports our third claim
regarding the origins of insurgency.
To provide further evidence, we also study the relationship between insurgency deaths and
land inequality as well as insurgency deaths and different measures of labor coercion. These
analyses are reported in Appendix Table C12. As we would expect, land inequality and labor
coercion are associated with a higher insurgent death rates. The regression results are significant
both statistically and economically. A one-standard-deviation increase in land inequality is linked
with 0.003 more insurgent deaths. Similar shifts in the share of tenant farmers or the share of
terminated tenant farmer contracts are associated with an increase of 0.005 in the insurgent death
rate, i.e., about one third of the mean. The regression results on wages are less robust in terms of
statistical significance, but they follow an expected pattern: locations with higher wages before
the civil war had less insurgency deaths
In Panel B of Table 5, we then assess the association between the famine shock or inequality in
the early 1900s, and White casualties. By examining casualties on different sides of the conflict,
we are not only measuring those who had less to lose in general, or were born in somehow more
conflict-prone areas. While columns (1) and (2) indicate a positive correlation between famine
casualties and White casualties, columns (3) and (4) suggest that crop failures had no impact on
civil war participation on the government side. Similarly, economic inequality in the early 1900s
is not associated with White casualties.
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Our findings go somewhat against prior explanations offered by Finnish scholars of the
conflict. For example, Alapuro (1988) argues, in line with Tilly (1978) and Skocpol (1979), that
dissatisfaction with the economic circumstances did not cause the rebellion. Instead, he stresses
the importance of abundant resources and armed organizations of the Red and White guards.
Alapuro (1988) also highlights the role of limited state capacity and the power vacuum that the
end of the Russian rule created. These were undoubtedly elementary factors, but they cannot
explain the geographical variation in insurgency within Finland that we observe.
Table 5. Famine, inequality, and insurgency.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Insurgent casualty share
Famine deaths per capita 0.103*** 0.079***
(0.018) (0.015)
Crop failure 0.004** 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002)
Income Gini 0.054*** 0.040***
(0.009) (0.008)
Conley SE 0.036 0.024 0.003 0.002 0.015 0.011
N 408 408 327 327 419 419
R2 0.441 0.620 0.404 0.583 0.440 0.617
Outcome mean 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.016
Panel B: White casualty share
Famine deaths per capita 0.008*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003)
Crop failure 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Income Gini -0.003 0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
Conley SE 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002
N 408 408 327 327 419 419
R2 0.107 0.291 0.072 0.229 0.096 0.267
Outcome mean 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Controls
County FE
Notes: Baseline controls included in all estimations are latitude, longitude, log suitability for rye, log
suitability for barley, log elevation, and log population in 1865. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. Conley standard errors allow for spatial autocorrelation among municipalities that are
within 50 kilometers of each other. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively.
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Who Joined the Insurgency? We take advantage of the rich individual-level dataset to further
describe the socioeconomic status of those who perished—and thus participated in—the civil
conflict. The occupations of the deceased are potentially a good proxy for the occupations of
those who participated in the conflict. If the conflict truly was about demanding more
redistribution and equality, we would expect that the insurgents disproportionately represent
lower socioeconomic groups.37
We present the occupational structure of the deceased in Panel A of Figure 6.38 It clearly shows
that the deaths on the revolutionary side of the conflict originated in larger numbers from less-
skilled and lower-wage occupations. The largest share of casualties were from the unskilled manual
labor group which mainly consisted of lower-level farm (including tenant farmers) and factory
workers. Land laborers were also an important part of the Red casualties. On the government side,
land owners were the largest group among the civil war casualties. Arguably, they would have had
the most to lose if the redistributional policies demanded by the insurgents had been passed. In
Panel B of Figure 6, we show the share of deaths in the occupational groups by the side of the
conflict. It shows that approximately 90% of the high grade professionals who died in the conflict
were on the White side, whereas over 90% of the unskilled manual laborers were on the Red side.
In the group of non-manual employees, the shares are almost equal between the two sides of the
civil war.
4.3 Inequality and Redistribution after the Civil War
The last step of our empirical analysis concerns the turn in inequality and the increase in
redistribution after the Civil War of 1918. After the conflict, the national government
implemented large scale land reforms that allowed tenant farmers to buy the land they occupied
and other lands they required. In addition to the land reform, the franchise was extended in the
municipal councils to all citizens and votes were no longer tied to taxable income. This plausibly
affected differently regions with different pre-conflict distributions of income and voting rights.39
In this section, we provide evidence on how these national policies (together with the earlier
violent uprising) could explain the downward turn in Finnish inequality.
37In related work, Arosalo (1998) uses aggregate-level data to study how the economic and political situation of
different social strata is associated with political violence during the Finnish Civil War. She also quotes reports from
the hearings of the high treason courts of the year 1918 which suggest that about one third of the insurgents were
motivated by shortage of work and low wages.
38We assign the occupations to larger socioeconomic classes that broadly follow the commonly used Eriksson and
Goldthorpe (1992) classification scheme. Note that we only use information on civil war casualties who came from
municipalities included in the sample that we use in our main analyses.
39Tyrefors Hinnerich et al. (2017) study a similar reform in Sweden.
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Panel B: Share of casualties
Red White
Figure 6. Civil war casualties by occupational class and conflict side.
Evolution of Redistribution We start by looking at changes in the Gini coefficient between the
years 1904-1938. Panel A of Table 6 reports the regression results on the association between
the change in inequality and the famine, initial inequality, and insurgency. As already established
in Figure 5, inequality decreased more after the conflict in areas that were most affected by the
famine shock. The estimates in columns (1) and (2) of Panel A show that the Gini coefficient
dropped approximately 0.01 points more between 1904 and 1938 in locations that experienced one
standard deviation more famine deaths. Similarly, municipalities that experienced a crop failure
also saw about 0.02− 0.03 points larger decreases in income inequality (columns 3 and 4). This
impact is equal to about one-tenth of the mean.
We then look at the association between changes in inequality and the initial level in columns
(5) and (6). Municipalities with more inequality in the early 1900s had a more concentrated
distribution of political power. Thus, they ought to be affected the most by the municipal
franchise reform. Indeed, columns (7) and (8) of Panel A reveal that a one-standard-deviation
increase in income Gini 1904 is associated with about a 0.08 points larger change in the Gini
coefficient. This change is almost 32% of the mean. Furthermore, the last two columns in Panel A
show that inequality decreased the most in locations that had more insurgent deaths. A change
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equal to one standard deviation in insurgency per capita is associated with a 0.018 point decrease
in inequality. The effect size is about 7% relative to the mean.
We turn to explain this decrease in inequality by changes in different forms of redistribution in
Table 7. We measure redistribution by the large land reforms implemented in the 1920s as well as
by per capita municipal spending changes between the years 1912 and 1932. We see an increase
in redistributive policy outcomes, especially in health care spending, but most of the large and
sudden shift in inequality after the conflict can be attributed to the land reform. Panel A of Table 7
shows that the number of farms created in the 1920s land reforms (relative to the number of farms
in 1910) is significantly higher in municipalities that were hit by a more severe famine shock, that
had a more unequal distribution of income before the conflict, and that saw more insurgency. For
instance, the estimate in column (4) implies that experiencing a crop failure led to an increase of
0.05−0.07 in land redistribution which is about one fourth of the mean. Column (6) implies that
a similar increase in the 1904 Gini coefficient is associated with a 0.035 increase in the dependent
variable (13% of the mean), and based on column (8) we can infer that a one-standard deviation
increase in insurgency per capita is associated with a 0.065 higher land redistribution (24% of the
mean).
In the remaining panels of Table 7, we assess the relationship between changes in municipal
spending and the famine shock, income inequality before the conflict, and insurgency. Columns
(1)-(4) look at the association between the famine shock and municipal spending growth. The
estimates are positive and statistically significant for the famine deaths per capita, but the evidence
is weaker in the case of the crop failure variable. In Panel D, we see that municipalities that
were more exposed to the famine might have experienced greater growth of municipal health care
spending. Income inequality in 1904 has a clear positive association with the change in welfare
spending (columns 5 and 6 of Panel B). There is no statistically significant relationship between
initial inequality and municipal school spending growth (Panel C), although the point estimates
are positive. However, it appears that increases in health spending are greater in municipalities
that were more unequal before the civil war (Panel D). The regression results for insurgency per
capita (columns 7 and 8) are largely in line with the other point estimates in terms of their sign and
statistical significance.
While there is some indication that policies changed after the democratization, the changes in
public spending were not overwhelming. But as discussed by Acemoglu et al. (2015), democracy
does not change inequality quickly by affecting policies. The reason inequality decreased rapidly in
Finland seems to be because of the extensive land reforms which plausibly had a more immediate
effect on inequality in an agrarian society. Yet, our results do suggest some changes in social
policies, especially in health spending at the municipal level which can be expected to be targeted






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7. Regression results for redistribution after the civil war.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Land redistribution
Famine deaths per capita 1.073*** 0.777***
(0.175) (0.177)
Crop failure 0.067*** 0.050**
(0.019) (0.021)
Income Gini 0.584*** 0.398***
(0.088) (0.092)
Insurgency per capita 4.008*** 3.264***
(0.611) (0.705)
Conley SE 0.275 0.249 0.021 0.020 0.113 0.099 0.594 0.686
N 398 398 320 320 409 409 409 409
R2 0.339 0.419 0.416 0.498 0.339 0.418 0.373 0.435
Outcome mean 0.276 0.276 0.278 0.278 0.272 0.272 0.272 0.272
Panel B: ∆ Municipal welfare spending 1912-1932
Famine deaths per capita 0.827* 0.951**
(0.445) (0.470)
Crop failure -0.036 -0.005
(0.052) (0.054)
Income Gini 0.722*** 0.667***
(0.244) (0.246)
Insurgency per capita 2.428* 0.924
(1.362) (1.608)
Conley SE 0.450 0.410 0.051 0.051 0.330 0.302 1.844 1.679
N 398 398 322 322 409 409 409 409
R2 0.082 0.143 0.082 0.155 0.114 0.178 0.101 0.163
Outcome mean 3.220 3.220 3.248 3.248 3.229 3.229 3.229 3.229
Panel C: ∆ Municipal school spending 1912-1932
Famine deaths per capita 1.123** 0.887*
(0.475) (0.517)
Crop failure 0.048 0.061
(0.045) (0.051)
Income Gini 0.206 0.004
(0.245) (0.258)
Insurgency per capita 0.413 0.606
(1.133) (1.305)
Conley SE 0.573 0.615 0.046 0.048 0.176 0.183 1.399 1.576
N 397 397 321 321 408 408 408 408
R2 0.106 0.133 0.112 0.141 0.093 0.127 0.091 0.127
Outcome mean 1.871 1.871 1.853 1.853 1.865 1.865 1.865 1.865
Panel D: ∆ Municipal health spending 1912-1932
Famine deaths per capita 2.998*** 2.517***
(0.818) (0.901)
Crop failure 0.186** 0.174*
(0.093) (0.100)
Income Gini 1.182** 1.011*
(0.506) (0.533)
Insurgency per capita 7.381*** 8.252***
(2.511) (3.062)
Conley SE 0.895 0.997 0.130 0.135 0.503 0.514 2.598 2.853
N 394 394 322 322 405 405 405 405
R2 0.042 0.062 0.059 0.082 0.027 0.049 0.032 0.056
Outcome mean 3.791 3.791 3.824 3.824 3.790 3.790 3.790 3.790
Controls
County FE
Notes: Baseline controls included in all estimations are latitude, longitude, log suitability for rye, log suitability for barley, log elevation, and
log population in 1865. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Conley standard errors allow for spatial autocorrelation among
municipalities that are within 50 kilometers of each other. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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5 Discussion
Compared to other European countries and the major political reforms carried out at the national
level in Finland, the municipal suffrage reform was implemented relatively late. Scholars have
speculated that if concessions had been made sooner, the Finnish Civil War could have been
avoided (see, e.g., Katajisto 2018). In light of our empirical illustration, these speculations seem
warranted: the conflict was most intense in locations that had higher underlying (political and
economic) inequality. There were signs of discontent already before the civil war which we
discuss first in this section. We next try to shed some light on why inequality triggered a civil war
in Finland. For instance, Finland’s western neighbor Sweden had high levels of inequality and
similar voting institutions until the year 1919 (see Bengtsson 2019). Yet the country did not
experience a civil war, but reformed its institutions in more peacefully. In Norway, the state
successfully suffocated the perceived revolutionary threat by reducing working hours and
expanding social transfer programs (Bergli Rasmussen and Knutsen 2020). Lastly, we rule out
some alternative mechanisms through which the civil war could have plausibly influenced
inequality and redistribution.
5.1 Discontent before the Civil War
There were signs of resentment already before the civil war. For instance, industrial action and
strikes became more and more common alongside with the increasing popularity of the labor
movement. For some time, the elites were able to make concessions to hold major conflicts at bay.
The general strike of 1905 is a good example (see, for instance, Alapuro 1988). In October 1905,
many factories, government offices, schools and stores were closed for a few days in different
parts of the country. It has been argued that to appease the working classes who were disgruntled
by poor working and living conditions, the elites carried out major reforms such as ending the era
of Russification in Finland and granting universal suffrage in the Parliamentary elections.40
Economic Grievances and Voting The first Finnish Parliament was elected in 1907 in an election
where almost all men and women older than 24 years were allowed to vote. While the reform did
not change the fact the Russian Emperor held the ultimate political power in the country, it allowed,
for the first time in history, parts of the population to vote and express their political preferences.
Did the voting behavior in pre-conflict elections exhibit any signs of discontent? It is well known
40Russification was a policy aimed at limiting the autonomic status of the Grand Duchy of Finland during the years
1899–1905. During this era, young Finnish men were conscripted in the Russian military, Finnish newspapers were
under strict censorship, and public officials were fired and replaced with Russians, among other things. The country
experienced another period of Russification right before the civil war, in 1908–1917. See, for instance, Haltzel et al.
(1981).
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that voters may reward or punish the incumbent based on their personal economic stance, or they
may use past outcomes as a basis for their expectations for future outcomes (Fiorina 1981; Key
1966).
To test for this possibility, we have collected data on the results of parliamentary elections by
municipalities to measure variation in political preferences. We concentrate on votes for the Social
Democratic Party. Due to the universal suffrage, the Social Democratic vote share also capturates
more moderate tendencies than direct insurgency participation; some individuals may have been
supporters of a non-violent revolution. In the early 1900s, the Social Democratic Party was the
largest individual party but the bourgeois parties held more than half of the seats for most of the
first two decades. The Social Democratic Party was actively advocating for tenant farmers’ rights,
a land reform, improving the working conditions of laborers, and limiting the number of working
hours, among other things.
In Panel A of Table 8, we quantify the relationship between Social Democrats’ average vote
share in elections held between 1910 and 1917, our measures of famine exposure, and income
inequality in 1904. The positive connection is clear. For instance, the column (4) shows that
Social Democrats’ vote share was about 6−9% higher in municipalities that had a crop failure in
the year 1867. Focusing on column (6), we see that a one-standard-deviation shift in the 1904
Gini coefficient is associated with an increase of about 6% in Social Democrats’ vote share. The
magnitude of these point estimates seems sizeable also compared to the average vote share of
about 40%. We complement these findings with Appendix Table D1 that explores the link
between different land inequality and labor coercion measures, and Social Democrats’ electoral
performance. In all of these estimations, we see a correlation that we would expect to see: Social
Democrats performed better in municipalities where land inequality was higher, or if the local
labor market conditions were more coercive.
Workers’ Associations Close to the Social Democratic party were so-called workers’
associations that became increasingly popular in the late 1800s and early 1900s among
agricultural, industrial, and other workers. They were organizations that were distinct from labor
unions, and they were intended to foster cooperation among the working classes and improve
their working conditions. Alapuro (1988), among others, has highlighted the importance of
workers’ associations in organizing the insurgent groups and arming them during the civil war.
We have collected data on local workers’ associations and their membership numbers from
statistics published by the Social Democratic Party (see Turkia 1907). Panel B of Table 8
indicates that there were more workers’ association members per capita in municipalities that
were hit harder by the famine (columns 1-4). It is also clear that a larger share of the municipal
population belonged to a workers’ association in more unequal locations (columns 5 and 6). The
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specification that controls for county fixed effects suggests that a one-standard-deviation increase
in the 1904 Gini coefficient is associated with a 2% higher membership rate. We corroborate
these findings in the auxiliary materials by showing that land inequality and labor coercion
measures were also positively associated with workers’ association membership rates (Appendix
Table D2). Appendix Tables D3 and D4 show that the relationship between the presence of
workers’ associations, inequality and labor coercion follows the same pattern.
Strikes in 1917 Workers’ associations also had an important role in mobilizing workers during
strikes. Strike activities continued actively even after the general strike of 1905, and the year
preceding the Civil War the number of strikes hit a new record. For example, during the previous
peak year of 1907, there had been slightly less than two hundred strikes with around 20,000
participants. In the year 1917, the number of strikes rose close to five hundred. Almost 140,000
workers joined the protests, and about one and a half million working days were lost in total
(Tilastokeskus 1990). According to Aatsinki (2009), the largest occupational groups that took
part in strikes were agricultural workers (about 16,000 participants) and log drivers (about 17,000
participants) whose demands were typically about lowering the number of working hours and
increasing wages.
We find some evidence suggesting that agricultural workers were participating more in
municipalities that were hit harder by the famine and that had higher levels of inequality and labor
coercion. In Panel C of Table 8, we illustrate the relationship between the total number of strike
days per capita, and the famine and economic inequality. While systematically positive and robust
to different specifications, the regression results do not suggest that there is a statistically
significant relationship between the famine and strike participation. The results for inequality are
clearer. For example, column (6) indicates that an increase of one standard deviation in economic
inequality was associated with an increase of 0.09 in the strike days per capita. We also
investigate the correlation between land inequality, labor coercion, and strikes in Appendix Table
D5. We see that there were more strike days per capita in locations with more land inequality,
with more tenant farmers, with more terminated leases, or with lower wages.41
In November 1917, just a few months after the Russian revolution and a few months before the
beginning of the civil conflict, the discontent culminated in another general strike. The elites did
41We use data collected from 1917 and 1918 issues of Työtilastollinen aikakauslehti and Sosialinen aikakauskirja
(the Journal of Employment Statistics and the Journal of Social Issues) that report the occurrence of strikes and
participation in them for the year 1917. Note that there were several region- and nation-wide strikes during the year.
We only use data on strikes the exact location of which can be pinned down. We corroborate the results reported here
by demonstrating that the famine, inequality, and labor coercion mattered for the occurrence of strikes in an expected
way in Appendix Tables D6 and D7. Furthermore, Appendix Tables D8-D11 show that we obtain similar results if we
use data on all strikes and not just those of agricultural workers.
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try to tackle the unrest with concessions: they limited the working day length to eight hours and
reformed the municipal franchise, for instance.
Civil War as a Bargaining Failure It is possible that inequality would have dropped even
without an armed conflict. While in other Nordic countries the state renegotiated the social
contract making many social changes without any violent conflict, the social unrest persisted in
Finland and escalated into a full-blown conflict in January 1918. Why did the conflict arise
despite the government’s concessions and relatively rational expectation that there would be more
redistribution?42 Undoubtedly, it was important that Finland had just become independent of
Russia that also experienced a revolution. But it is likely that other forces were also at play.
First, it could be that promises of changes came too late. Even if the government made
appeasing concessions, the lasting inequality and labor coercion could have led to grievances that
were hard to forget. Some of the violence in 1918 was likely due to this less “rationalist”
motivation. In Panel A of Table 5, we saw that White casualties were not associated with
inequality. However, this is only part of the story. If we focus on Whites who were murdered
during the war, we see a strong positive correlation between underlying inequality and the
casualty rate (Panel A of Figure 7). This further supports the argument that people in more
unequal localities took part in the insurgency because of their discontent. While also the rate of
murdered Reds is correlated with initial inequality, there is a crucial distinction between the
murders of Reds and Whites. Panel B of Figure 7 plots the number of murdered Reds and Whites
by date. We see that Whites were murdered in particular at the beginning of the conflict, whereas
the murders of Reds peak towards the end of the civil war when many of them were imprisoned
and executed. Battle deaths do not exhibit a similar distinction. Instead, the number of daily
deaths on the two sides almost fully coincide with each other.
Second, it could also be that the government’s promises were simply not enough to calm the
working classes. For instance, social scientist Aksel Warén wrote an influential piece
Torpparioloista Suomessa (1898) stating that the largest social problem in rural Finland was the
uncertainty associated with tenant farming. He stressed the need for juridicial rights and written
contracts for the tenants. However, he did not even imagine a complete eradication of the
institution which would allow farmers to buy their own land, suggesting that the grievances in
rural Finland and the concessions that were needed to avoid violence were still considerably
underestimated (Peltonen 1990).
Third, it is possible that there was a lack of proper commitment to the reforms. Without
democracy at the local level, it is hard to believe that redistributive policies, if implemented,
42A large literature in conflict studies highlights the importance of bargaining failures as a cause of civil conflict
(see Walter 2009 for a review).
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Table 8. Determinants of pre-civil war discontent.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: SDP vote share
Famine deaths per capita 1.346*** 0.966***
(0.202) (0.196)
Crop failure 0.089*** 0.055**
(0.023) (0.022)
Income Gini 0.905*** 0.717***
(0.096) (0.091)
Conley SE 0.282 0.267 0.030 0.028 0.139 0.118
N 363 363 294 294 374 374
R2 0.385 0.497 0.266 0.423 0.424 0.527
Outcome mean 0.409 0.409 0.442 0.442 0.410 0.410
Panel B: Workers’ association members
Famine deaths per capita 0.186*** 0.152**
(0.067) (0.071)
Crop failure 0.014* 0.014
(0.007) (0.008)
Income Gini 0.227*** 0.216***
(0.034) (0.038)
Conley SE 0.090 0.085 0.008 0.009 0.041 0.044
N 404 404 324 324 415 415
R2 0.170 0.210 0.164 0.197 0.236 0.270
Outcome mean 0.056 0.056 0.060 0.060 0.056 0.056
Panel C: Strike participation
Famine deaths per capita 1.914 1.586
(1.233) (1.268)
Crop failure 0.280 0.263
(0.250) (0.217)
Income Gini 0.881** 1.007*
(0.341) (0.530)
Conley SE 0.890 1.125 0.234 0.189 0.240 0.347
N 404 404 324 324 415 415
R2 0.015 0.028 0.018 0.036 0.014 0.028
Outcome mean 0.163 0.163 0.161 0.161 0.159 0.159
Baseline controls
County FE
Notes: Baseline controls included in all estimations are latitude, longitude, log suitability for rye, log
suitability for barley, log elevation, and log population in 1865. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Conley standard errors allow for spatial autocorrelation among municipalities that are within 50
kilometers of each other. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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would be permanent. It is easy for the elites not to commit. In fact, this is a key part of the
theoretical model of Acemoglu and Robinson (2000). Moreover, the lack of state power and the
monopoly of violence could have expedited the commitment problem (Alapuro 1988).
Our fourth and final remark is related to the circle of violence that emerged in the year 1918.
The civil war was not a centrally planned uprising against the elites. On the contrary, it was the
result of local skirmishes that escalated to violence in many municipalities. Such a process would
potentially have been hard to stop non-violently, even if the government offered more
redistribution.
5.2 Some Alternative Mechanisms
There are a number of factors that could explain the increasing and decreasing trends of inequality
in Finland. We will next discuss a few alternative mechanisms and illustrate that the famine was
less likely to matter for later outcomes through these channels.
Industrialization before the Conflict The original argument of Kuznets (1955) was that
inequality first rises with economic development as countries industrialize and then falls as the
fruits of industrialization and productivity growth trickle down to the working classes. For
instance, this could happen because wealthier people initially have profitable investment
opportunities, while an inflow of cheap labor from rural areas to cities keeps wages down. We
believe that this is unlikely to explain the pattern that we see in Finland. First, Appendix Figure
D3 shows the share of workers across main sectors and the share of value added by sector. It
demonstrates two key features of the Finnish economy. Finland was primarily an agrarian country
in the early 20th century. Almost 70 percent of households were employed in agriculture, and
almost half of the value added was generated in the agricultural sector. The rise in manufacturing
was modest before the civil war. Large-scale industrialization followed only much later, in part
due to the war reparations that Finland had to pay to the Soviet Union after the WWII (see
Mitrunen 2020). Thus, if industrialization was the driver of the income inequality, it should have
had a tremendous influence on the economy very early on in the industrialization process.
Second, we do not find any evidence that the famine would have been associated with
industrialization in Finland (Appendix Tables D13 and D14). Thus, it is unlikely that
industrialization would be driving our results in the way that in Kuznets argued. This could have
been the case, for instance, if the famine had stimulated the migration of cheap rural labor force to
cities.
Famine and Emigration Another alternative explanation relating famines to democratization
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Panel B: Deaths over time
Figure 7. Murders during the Finnish Civil War.
Notes: Panel A of the figure plots the relationship between economic inequality in 1904 and
murdered Whites (left-hand side graph) or Reds (right-hand side graph) per capita. Robust standard
errors of the slope coefficients are reported in parentheses. Dots are binned averages computed
within twenty bins with an equal number of observations. We net out baseline controls and region
fixed effects. Panel B of the figure shows the daily number of deaths for individuals who were
murdered (left-hand side graph) or who fell in a battle (right-hand side graph). The dashed lines
mark the starting and ending dates of the Finnish Civil War.
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continent, people expressed discontent after large negative shocks by emigrating to the Americas,
in particular to the United States. Narciso et al. (2020) find that the Great Irish Famine, highly lethal
mass starvation that took place about four decades before the Finnish famine, was a significant
long-run driver of Irish individuals’ migration choices. In Sweden, the same weather shock that
caused the Finnish famine triggered the first wave of emigration to North America. Karadja and
Prawitz (2019) show that the mass emigration increased the remaining workers’ bargaining power
and paved the way for increased demands for political change. Importantly, welfare expenditures
went up in Swedish municipalities that also became more likely to adopt more inclusive political
institutions.
A large number of Finns also emigrated during the Age of Mass Migration. However,
emigration from Finland truly kicked off much later than in Sweden: there was no first wave in
the aftermath of the famine, and the peak of emigration was only in 1902 when a total of 25,000
emigrants left the country. More importantly, looking at the geographic distribution of emigrants
across municipalities, we do not find any compelling evidence that emigration would have been
driven by the famine shock (Appendix Table D12). To investigate this possibility, we use annual
emigration statistics to measure the number of emigrants from each municipality between 1893
and 1914.43 While the regression coefficients are positive throughout the table, they are small in
magnitude and mostly statistically insignificant. Thus, our results do not support the idea that the
famine would have induced a massive flow of emigration, which in turn could have induced an
increase in workers’ bargaining power.44
Political Behavior before and after 1918 We have argued that the leveling of income
distribution was at least partially due to the municipal franchise extension that happened after the
1918 Civil War. Also other types of political forces might have influenced the declining trend in
inequality. It could be that there was a shift in the demand for left-wing politicians. Appendix
Figure D1 shows regression results from an event-study specification where we look at the
connection between inequality, famine, and insurgency on voting for the Social Democratic Party.
If anything, this relationship appears to be negative. In particular, Social Democrats’ vote share
decreases the most in locations that were more exposed to the insurgency. This relationship may
be merely mechanical, as insurgents were more likely to vote for the Social Democrats and also
more likely to die in the war. Be it as it may, we see more redistribution in these locations despite
the drop in votes for Social Democrats. Thus, it seems more likely that other parties moved closer
43Unfortunately, Statistics Finland did not publish emigration statistics by municipality before 1893. However,
these data capture most of the variation in emigration by municipality, as emigration from Finland prior to 1890s was
relatively modest and decreased dramatically during the First World War.
44This is in tally with the remarks made by Alapuro (1990). He argues that those individuals who were exposed
to the famine simply did not have sufficient resources to protest. According to Alapuro, there were vast similarities in
the famines that Finland and Ireland experienced, but the reactions in these two countries were dramatically different.
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to the new median voter and this increased redistribution. However, an important limitation of this
analysis is that our policies are determined by local politicians but we do not have data on local
government elections. We only observe electoral behavior in the parliamentary elections.
There could also be effects on voter turnout which could have downstream effects on
policymakers’ incentives and their policy output. On the one hand, one might expect that a greater
exposure to a civil conflict could hinder political participation, for instance, by undermining trust
in the government. On the other hand, the little evidence that we have points to the opposite
direction. For example, Blattman (2009) documents that forced recruitment leads to notably
greater postwar political participation in Uganda. Appendix Figure D2 again presents point
estimates from an event-study specification. We do not find any apparent indications that voter
turnout would have reacted notably to the underlying inequality or the civil war after 1918. Thus,
effects on voter turnout also seem like a less plausible channel.
6 Concluding Remarks
Inequality and conflict are both closely tied to the economic development of countries. But can
inequality lead to violent conflict, and can insurgency promote a more equal distribution of wealth
and income? These questions have received vast scholarly attention (see, e.g., Acemoglu and
Robinson 2000; Wood 2003; Moore 2016; Scheidel 2018), but empirical work establishing these
links and exploring the underlying mechanisms still remains limited. We address this deficit by
using historical data from Finland. As of today, Finland is considered to be among the most
equal and the most democratic societies. For instance, the World Bank’s most recent estimate of
Finland’s Gini coefficient was 0.27, making Finland the 8th-most equal country in the world. In
the Polity IV classification scheme, the country has been defined as fully democratic for more than
seven decades.
Contrary to popular belief, this equality has not always been the case. Merely a hundred years
ago, extreme economic inequality and exclusive political institutions were defining characteristics
of the Finnish society. This paper first demonstrates that the famine of 1866-1868 had a persistent
impact on inequality and labor coercion in Finland in the early 1900s. We then argue that these
inequalities were a substantial trigger for the Finnish Civil War in 1918. Exploiting individual-
level data on civil war casualties, we document that insurgency was higher in places that were
more affected by the famine and that had more inequality and labor coercion. Finally, we show
that after the civil war and the adoption of democratic practices in local elections, the shift towards
equality and higher levels of redistribution was more substantial in municipalities with higher levels
of inequality before the conflict.
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Our study offers an empirical illustration of a case in which an insurgency and subsequent
redistribution boosted equality.45 Particularly important was the land reform that was heavily
influenced by the underlying inequalities and the insurgency. Furthermore, after the Civil War
previously unrepresented segments of society gained political representation in local governments
and were able to participate in decision-making. Forces such as middle class bias or elite capture
were less likely to play an important role, paving the path for more equality and redistribution.
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A Additional Backround on the Famine
While rye was the most important source of calories and the most important crop in Finland around
the famine years, also other types of crops were affected by the shock. We illustrate this in Figure
A1 where Panel A shows grain production for four types of crops (rye, barley, oats, and wheat)
over time. We see that besides rye, barley crop was particularly affected by the same underlying
wether conditions. Oats and wheat were less important for calorific intake. The producer prices of
all crops hiked up around the famine years, as we show in Panel B. In Figure A2, we demonstrate
that other types of agricultural products were less affected by the famine. On the other hand, the
figure suggests that the production of these crops did not increase in response to the famine.
We provide some descriptive evidence on the economic problems caused by the famine in
Figure A3. These figures use data on the universe of Finnish newspapers to illustrate that the
prevalence of newspaper mentions of bankruptcy and auctions increased after the famine. The
share of pages containing hits for bankruptcy and auction increased five and two fold, respectively.
We also find evidence suggesting that a gap in advertisements on sales and purchases emerges
around the famine years. The newspaper data are available through the National Library of Finland
at https://digi.kansalliskirjasto.fi/search?formats=NEWSPAPER&set_language=en
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Figure A1. Grain production and prices over time.
Notes: The dashed lines mark the famine years. The left-hand side graph shows grain production
in millions of kilograms, and the right-hand side graph reports the producer prices (Finnish Marks

























Figure A2. Other agricultural production over time.
Notes: The dashed lines mark the famine years. The graph shows agricultural production in




































































Figure A3. Famine in newspapers.
Notes: The dashed lines mark the famine years. The figures are based on data from the National
Library of Finland. The data are available online at https://digi.kansalliskirjasto.fi/
search?formats=NEWSPAPER&set_language=en (accessed May 27, 2020).
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B Measurement of Inequality
The municipality level income statistics for years 1865, 1881, 1932, 1935, and 1938 are binned by
tax groups and a large part of the population did not pay any taxes. To estimate Gini coefficients for
each municipality we use robust Pareto midpoint estimator suggested by von Hippel et al. (2016)
which takes into account the binned nature of the data and the open-ended largest tax bracket. This
implementation is available in the rpme package in Stata.
Our income data allow us to estimate a number of other inequality measures. They are all
strongly correlated with the Gini coefficient. We illustrate this point graphically in Figure B1
where we plot the Gini coefficient against eight different inequality measures. The first inequality
measure in the is the median-mean ratio. It is particularly interesting to see a close connection here,
as in the Meltzer-Richard model that we use as one of the theoretical motivations behind our study.
The other figures correlate the Gini coefficient with other occasionally used inequality measures:
relative mean deviation; Mehran, Piesch, Kakwani, Theil and generalized entropy indices; and
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Figure B1. Relationship between the Gini coefficient and other inequality measures.
Notes: The figures show the relationship between the Gini coefficient and other inequality
measures. We use data from the year 1904. Observations have been binned within twenty bins
with an equal number of observations. Robust standard errors are indicated in parentheses.
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C Additional Tables and Figures for the Main Results Section
C.1 Event-Study Estimates
As a starting point for our empirical analyses, we estimated the following event-study model:
Ginimt = ∑
s 6=1865
δs (Famine exposurem×1(t = s))+λm +λt +ηmt .
Here Ginimt is income inequality in municipality m in the year t and Famine exposurem is either
the death rate during the famine yearsor a dummy for crop failure in 1867. λt and λm are year and
municipality fixed effects, respectively, and ηmt is the error term. δt are year-specific coefficients
that we plotted in the main text Figure 5. We present more detailed estimates in Table C1, again
setting 1865 as the base year. We cluster standard errors at the municipal level and include county
fixed effects and our baseline controls (rye suitability, latitude, longitude, logarithm of population
in 1865, and land ruggedness) interacted with year fixed effects. One important notion from this
table is that we can reject the hypothesis that δ1904 = δ1931 for both measures, meaning that
inequality declined more in areas with more severe famine. Furthermore, we see that the point
estimates obtained for post-civil war years decline compared to the years before. This gives
support to our main argument that the Civil War was an important turning point in inequality.
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Table C1. Flexible effects of famine on income inequality.
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Famine deaths and inequality
δ 1881 × Famine death share 0.309** 0.224 0.126
(0.133) (0.138) (0.138)
δ 1904 × Famine death share 0.654*** 0.613*** 0.533***
(0.150) (0.162) (0.168)
δ 1931 × Famine death share 0.371*** 0.314** 0.285*
(0.141) (0.150) (0.145)
δ 1935 × Famine death share 0.377*** 0.353** 0.306**
(0.145) (0.153) (0.141)
δ 1938 × Famine death share 0.378*** 0.344** 0.285**
(0.146) (0.154) (0.142)
N 2037 2037 1996
R2 0.769 0.786 0.798
δ 1904 = δ 1931 (p-value) 0.001 0.002 0.027
Panel B: Crop failure and inequality
δ 1881 × Crop failure 0.015 0.014 0.014
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
δ 1904 × Crop failure 0.030** 0.038** 0.031*
(0.014) (0.016) (0.016)
δ 1931 × Crop failure 0.008 0.008 0.002
(0.013) (0.016) (0.016)
δ 1935 × Crop failure 0.007 0.008 0.003
(0.013) (0.016) (0.016)
δ 1938 × Crop failure 0.010 0.013 0.004
(0.013) (0.016) (0.015)
N 1762 1762 1732
R2 0.775 0.789 0.801
δ 1904 = δ 1931 (p-value) 0.048 0.019 0.020
Year × County FE
Year × Controls
Notes: All regressions include municipality fixed effects. Robust standard
errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses.
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
SI-8
C.2 Robustness to Additional Controls
In our main analyses, we chose the set of control variables to maximize the number of observations
we have available. However, as Table 2 reveals, we have a more extensive set of pre-treatment
covariates available for a more limited sample. We repeat our main analyses by augmenting the
set of baseline controls (logarithm of population in 1865, rye suitability, barley suitability, land
ruggedness, latitude, and longitude) with the other variables that we have: population density,
rainfall, income Gini in 1865, mean income in 1865, distance to Helsinki, distance to Turku, and
cereal suitability.
Table C2 reports the regression results for the impact of the famine on income and land
inequality in the early 1900s. We see that the estimates for the relationship between the famine
death share or the crop failure and the 1904 Gini index or the 1910 land Gini are statistically
significant and in the same ballpark as the results that we report in the main text. We also find
strong evidence that the famine exposure is linked with increasing prevalence of tenant farming
(Panel A of Table C3). There does not appear to be a relationship between the famine and
terminated leases (Panel B), but there is weak evidence of famine exposure affecting wages
negatively (Panel C).
We then assess the robustness of the insurgency results in Table C4. The results suggest that
insurgency participation was higher where the famine caused more deaths or in municipalities that
lost their rye harvest. Furthermore, the correlation between pre-conflict inequality and insurgency
persists even after we include the additional control variables (columns 5 and 5).
Our results on inequality and redistribution after the civil war remain similarly unaffected by
the inclusion of the extended set of controls. Table C5 still indicates that inequality went down the
most in locations that were the most exposed to the famine (columns 1-4), that had higher levels
of inequality in the early 1900s (columns 5 and 6), or that had more insurgency participation in the
Civil War (columns 7 and 8). As in the main text, the robustness check for Table C6 shows that we
can attribute the decrease in inequality mostly to the land reform (Panel A). The regression results
for spending growth are less clear (Panels B, C, and D), although there is some indication of health
spending increasing more in municipalities that were more severely affected by the famine, that
initially had more inequality, or that had more insurgency participation.
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Table C2. Famine and inequality in the early 1900s (additional control variables included).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Income Gini
Famine deaths per capita 0.307*** 0.195*
(0.105) (0.110)
Crop failure 0.023** 0.031***
(0.011) (0.012)
Conley SE 0.112 0.123 0.010 0.011
N 333 333 290 290
R2 0.310 0.349 0.217 0.305
Outcome mean 0.499 0.499 0.508 0.508
Panel B: Land Gini
Famine deaths per capita 0.226*** 0.194**
(0.079) (0.092)
Crop failure 0.020** 0.017**
(0.008) (0.008)
Conley SE 0.084 0.088 0.007 0.008
N 329 329 288 288
R2 0.316 0.324 0.352 0.368
Outcome mean 0.398 0.398 0.400 0.400
Controls
County FE
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Conley standard errors allow for spatial autocorrelation among
municipalities that are within 50 kilometers of each other. ***,
** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
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Table C3. Famine and labor coercion in the early 1900s (additional control variables included).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Tenant farmer share
Famine deaths per capita 1.369*** 0.924***
(0.212) (0.206)
Crop failure 0.079*** 0.057***
(0.023) (0.022)
Conley SE 0.297 0.292 0.025 0.023
N 329 329 288 288
R2 0.584 0.663 0.583 0.681
Outcome mean 0.468 0.468 0.467 0.467
Panel B: Terminated leases share
Famine deaths per capita 0.070 0.016
(0.070) (0.073)
Crop failure 0.009 0.001
(0.007) (0.008)
Conley SE 0.064 0.053 0.006 0.006
N 317 317 278 278
R2 0.342 0.383 0.335 0.382
Outcome mean 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049
Panel C: Daily wage
Famine deaths per capita -4.010*** -3.139***
(0.720) (0.749)
Crop failure -0.171** -0.077
(0.073) (0.071)
Conley SE 0.904 0.862 0.068 0.071
N 316 316 275 275
R2 0.361 0.411 0.272 0.369
Outcome mean 3.014 3.014 3.006 3.006
Controls
County FE
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Conley standard
errors allow for spatial autocorrelation among municipalities that are within 50
kilometers of each other. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%
and 10% level, respectively.
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Table C4. Famine, inequality, and insurgency (additional control variables included).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Famine deaths per capita 0.114*** 0.096***
(0.022) (0.019)
Crop failure 0.004* 0.004*
(0.002) (0.002)
Income Gini 0.047*** 0.033***
(0.011) (0.010)
Conley SE 0.039 0.026 0.004 0.003 0.018 0.012
N 333 333 290 290 342 342
R2 0.483 0.628 0.462 0.597 0.468 0.615
Outcome mean 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018
Controls
County FE
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Conley standard errors allow
for spatial autocorrelation among municipalities that are within 50 kilometers of each other.
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Table C5. Regression results for change in inequality after the franchise reform (additional
control variables included).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Famine deaths per capita -0.228** -0.190
(0.115) (0.126)
Crop failure -0.017 -0.029**
(0.010) (0.012)
Income Gini -0.842*** -0.850***
(0.058) (0.061)
Insurgency per capita -0.778*** -0.771**
(0.282) (0.351)
Conley SE 0.101 0.116 0.010 0.011 0.058 0.057 0.299 0.391
N 330 330 289 289 339 339 339 339
R2 0.085 0.106 0.068 0.160 0.635 0.642 0.067 0.111
Outcome mean -0.249 -0.249 -0.254 -0.254 -0.251 -0.251 -0.251 -0.251
Notes: The dependent variable is change in Gini coefficient between the years 1904 and 1938. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. Conley standard errors allow for spatial autocorrelation among municipalities
that are within 50 kilometers of each other. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
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Table C6. Regression results for redistribution after the franchise reform (additional control
variables included).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Land redistribution
Famine deaths per capita 0.958*** 0.612***
(0.194) (0.205)
Crop failure 0.059*** 0.050**
(0.020) (0.022)
Income Gini 0.483*** 0.338***
(0.099) (0.101)
Insurgency per capita 3.295*** 2.632***
(0.672) (0.731)
Conley SE 0.235 0.222 0.017 0.017 0.096 0.078 0.404 0.509
N 325 325 285 285 334 334 334 334
R2 0.456 0.517 0.476 0.547 0.454 0.526 0.478 0.538
Outcome mean 0.280 0.280 0.276 0.276 0.275 0.275 0.275 0.275
Panel B: ∆ Municipal welfare spending 1912-1932
Famine deaths per capita 0.518 0.868
(0.564) (0.585)
Crop failure -0.058 -0.014
(0.052) (0.056)
Income Gini 0.442 0.376
(0.326) (0.313)
Insurgency per capita 0.716 -0.234
(1.583) (1.791)
Conley SE 0.526 0.451 0.051 0.051 0.417 0.360 1.781 1.799
N 324 324 285 285 333 333 333 333
R2 0.154 0.207 0.155 0.225 0.175 0.239 0.168 0.234
Outcome mean 3.212 3.212 3.250 3.250 3.223 3.223 3.223 3.223
Panel C: ∆ Municipal school spending 1912-1932
Famine deaths per capita 1.214** 0.932
(0.561) (0.623)
Crop failure 0.048 0.060
(0.049) (0.056)
Income Gini 0.167 -0.064
(0.300) (0.316)
Insurgency per capita 1.032 0.721
(1.258) (1.393)
Conley SE 0.643 0.697 0.042 0.044 0.229 0.239 1.593 1.675
N 323 323 284 284 332 332 332 332
R2 0.149 0.171 0.149 0.175 0.133 0.163 0.133 0.164
Outcome mean 1.849 1.849 1.838 1.838 1.845 1.845 1.845 1.845
Panel D: ∆ Municipal health spending 1912-1932
Famine deaths per capita 2.472** 2.063*
(1.019) (1.149)
Crop failure 0.122 0.117
(0.102) (0.112)
Income Gini 1.225** 1.159*
(0.617) (0.678)
Insurgency per capita 6.380** 8.197**
(2.617) (3.176)
Conley SE 0.985 1.174 0.126 0.133 0.633 0.627 2.167 2.539
N 324 324 286 286 333 333 333 333
R2 0.088 0.107 0.108 0.135 0.083 0.102 0.083 0.107
Outcome mean 3.811 3.811 3.822 3.822 3.813 3.813 3.813 3.813
Controls
County FE
Notes: The dependent variables are indicated in the table. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Conley standard errors allow for
spatial autocorrelation among municipalities that are within 50 kilometers of each other. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%
and 10% level, respectively.
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C.3 IV Results
Our main tables report OLS results measuring famine exposure with famine deaths and crop
failures. As Table 2 in the main text indicates, famine deaths were correlated with various
predetermined characteristics. We take this into account by always including control variables in
our OLS regressions, but there may still be other, potentially unobservable confounders. If that
was the case, our OLS estimates capture a conditional correlation between famine exposure and
economic grievances. In order to deal with the endogeneity concerns and to quantify the impact
of famine deaths on subsequent outcomes, we also estimate a 2SLS model and instrument the
famine severity with rye crop failure in 1867. As we show in Table 2, whether a municipality
experienced a crop failure or not in the year 1867 is orthogonal to various pre-famine
characteristics once we condition on rye suitability.
The first-stage regression takes the form
Death sharem = π +ρCrop f ailurem +X ′mϑ +µm.
Consider, for example, the first stage regression for income inequality in 1904, for which we have
320 observations. A regression with our baseline controls controls yields a coefficient ρ = 0.039
(p < 0.001, Kleibergen-Paap first-stage F = 42.30). Our first-stage regression coefficient is barely
affected when we include county fixed effects: ρ = 0.034 (p < 0.001, Kleibergen-Paap first-stage
F = 26.58). Therefore, Crop f ailurem is a relevant and strong instrument for Death sharem. The
identifying assumption here is Cov(Crop f ailurem,εm | Ryesuitabilitym) = 0. In other words, once
we control for rye suitability, the crop failure shock is not correlated with pre-existing municipal
characteristics. We consider the famine year deaths to serve as a proxy for the local severity of the
famine shock, including economic and social hardship and not only the demographic change. With
this in mind, the crop failure instrument should also fulfill the exclusion restriction, as it is unlikely
that a crop failure shock would affect inequality or labor market coercion via other channels than
the famine.
Tables C7-C11 show regression results corresponding to our main analyses, using the
instrumental variables approach. The 2SLS estimates are in line with the corresponding OLS and
reduced-form results that we report in the main text. Finally, note that even if the OLS captured
the causal effect of the famine on later outcomes, the OLS and IV estimates measure different
effects. While the IV esimates give us a local average treatment effect of famine severity (proxied
by the population change) in localities that experienced a crop failure, the OLS estimation yields
an average treatment effect. Many municipalities that did not experience a crop failure saw large
drops in population, for example, due to contagious diseases killing people.
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Table C7. Famine and inequality in the early 1900s: 2SLS estimates.
Income Gini Land Gini
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Famine deaths per capita 0.464* 0.513* 0.545** 0.566**
(0.253) (0.309) (0.222) (0.263)
Conley SE 0.267 0.327 0.243 0.288
N 322 322 317 317
First stage F 42.296 26.578 41.951 24.988
R2 0.199 0.248 0.125 0.186
Outcome mean 0.506 0.506 0.397 0.397
Controls
County FE
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Conley standard errors allow for spatial autocorrelation among
municipalities that are within 50 kilometers of each other. ***,
** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
Table C8. Famine and labor coercion in the early 1900s: 2SLS estimates.
Tenant farms % Terminated leases % Daily wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Famine deaths per capita 2.214*** 1.767*** 0.187 0.038 -5.567*** -2.510
(0.598) (0.627) (0.165) (0.190) (1.960) (2.031)
Conley SE 0.635 0.633 0.185 0.205 2.178 2.244
N 317 317 307 307 299 299
First stage F 41.951 24.988 41.119 23.935 33.263 20.646
R2 0.402 0.578 0.249 0.317 0.191 0.331
Outcome mean 0.474 0.474 0.049 0.049 3.013 3.013
Controls
County FE
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Conley standard errors allow for
spatial autocorrelation among municipalities that are within 50 kilometers of each other. ***,
** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table C9. Famine, and insurgency: 2SLS estimates.
(1) (2)
Famine deaths per capita 0.110** 0.123**
(0.054) (0.054)
Conley SE 0.069 0.060
N 320 320
First stage F 42.384 25.566
R2 0.465 0.608
Outcome mean 0.018 0.018
Controls
County FE
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Conley standard errors allow for
spatial autocorrelation among municipalities
that are within 50 kilometers of each other.
***, ** and * denote statistical significance
at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Table C10. Regression results for change in inequality after the franchise reform: 2SLS
estimates.
(1) (2)
Famine deaths per capita -0.471** -0.616**
(0.229) (0.308)
Conley SE 0.251 0.342
N 319 319
First stage F 42.335 25.586
R2 0.037 0.039
Outcome mean -0.252 -0.252
Controls
County FE
Notes: The dependent variable is change in
Gini coefficient between the years 1904 and
1938. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Conley standard errors allow for
spatial autocorrelation among municipalities
that are within 50 kilometers of each other.
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table C11. Regression results for redistribution after the franchise reform: 2SLS estimates.
Land redistribution ∆ Welfare spending ∆ School spending ∆ Health spending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Famine deaths per capita 1.679*** 1.493** -1.005 -0.269 1.080 1.721 5.234** 5.899*
(0.494) (0.631) (1.309) (1.576) (1.176) (1.536) (2.512) (3.147)
Conley SE 0.550 0.706 1.298 1.499 1.298 1.641 2.769 3.271
N 313 313 315 315 314 314 315 315
First stage F 40.119 23.998 43.030 26.488 41.324 24.570 39.784 24.116
R2 0.426 0.474 0.025 0.120 0.118 0.132 0.053 0.057
Outcome mean 0.281 0.281 3.240 3.240 1.855 1.855 3.828 3.828
Controls
County FE
Notes: The dependent variables are indicated in the table. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Conley standard errors allow for spatial autocorrelation among municipalities that are within 50 kilometers of
each other. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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C.4 Results from Randomization Inference
Figure C1 demonstrates that our results for the crop failure variable are robust to a randomization
inference approach. We conduct 1,000 permutations in which we randomly allocate
municipalities to the control (no crop failure) and treatment (crop failure) groups. We then
estimate the relationship between our outcome variables and the simulated crop failure dummy,
and compute the share of placebo coefficients that are larger in magnitude than the absolute
coefficient for the actual point estimate (our p value). There is a positive and statistically
significant effect of the famine on income inequality (Panel A), land inequality (Panel B), the
share of tenant farmers (Panel C), insurgency participation (Panel F), land reform (Panel H), and
health care spending (Panel K). There is also a negative and statistically significant effect on
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Figure C1. Results from a randomization inference approach.
Notes: The figures show the distribution of estimates from 1,000 permutations in which
observations are randomly assigned to the treatment and control groups (crop failure vs. no crop
failure). The dashed gray lines mark the estimated effect of experiencing a crop failure. The p-
values give the share of 1,000 placebo coefficients that are larger in magnitude than the absolute
coefficient for the actual point estimate. Estimations include the full set of controls.
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C.5 Regression Results on Land Inequality, Coercion, and Insurgency
Table C12 complements the results in our main text (where we show that locations with more
income inequality or a greater exposure to the famine had more insurgency) by showing that
insurgency is also associated with land inequality and labor coercion. Column (2) suggests that a
one-standard-deviation increase in land inequality is associated with a 0.003 higher insurgent
casualty rate. Similarly, increasing the share of tenant farmers by one standard deviation is linked
with a 0.006 higher insurgent casualty rate (column 4). The same number is 0.004 for the share of
terminated leases (column 6). The regression coefficients for wages are negative, and the point
estimate is only marginally significant when we include region fixed effects.
Table C12. Land inequality, labor coercion, and insurgency.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Land Gini 0.065*** 0.042***
(0.010) (0.009)
Tenant farm share 0.021*** 0.023***
(0.003) (0.003)
Terminated lease share 0.089*** 0.067***
(0.017) (0.014)
Daily wage -0.001 -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001)
Conley SE 0.013 0.012 0.006 0.005 0.022 0.014 0.002 0.001
N 414 414 414 414 401 401 393 393
R2 0.442 0.613 0.426 0.628 0.457 0.614 0.371 0.588
Outcome mean 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.017
Controls
County FE
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Conley standard errors allow for spatial autocorrelation
among municipalities that are within 50 kilometers of each other. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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D Additional Tables and Figures for the Discussion Section
D.1 Regression Results on Elections
In the discussion section of our main text, we show that the Social Democratic Party performed
better in the Parliamentary elections in municipalities that either were more exposed to the famine
or that had higher levels of economic inequality in the early 1900s. Table D1 shows that also
labor coercion correlates with Social Democrats’ electoral performance, all the reported point
estimates being higly statistically significant. Let us again focus on the specifications with control
variables. The regression coefficient for land Gini is 0.690 which means that a
one-standard-deviation increase in land inequality is associated with almost 5% higher vote
shares for the Social Democrats. The point estimate for the tenant farm share suggests that a shift
of the same magnitude is linked with over 13% higher vote shares, while this figure is about 6%
for the share of terminated leases. The support for Social Democrats was lower in locations where
the wages were higher: an increase of one standard deviation in the daily wage is associated with
about 4% less votes for the Social Democratic Party.
We have also used electoral data for a more extensive time period. We first use data on Social
Democrats’ vote shares over time to look at how it is associated with the famine, inequality, or
insurgency. Figure D1 reports regression coefficients from an event-study specification. We set
the pre-civil war year (1917) as the baseline. As before, all regressions control for municipality
fixed effects, county-year fixed effects, and baseline controls interacted with year dummies. First,
we see that there is no clear relationship between the famine and voting for the Social Democrats
(Panels A and B). Interestingly, the point estimates for inequality (Panel C) and insurgency (Panel
D) are negative. This relationship could be mechanical. When insurgents die—and more so in
municipalities that were more unequal, as we show in the main text—there are simply less party
supporters left.
We also assess whether any of the effects we observe could be attributed to increased voter
turnout. Figure D2 reveals that this is not the case: the regression coefficients are virtually always
indistinguishable from zero.
SI-21
Table D1. Labor coercion and Social Democrats’ electoral performance.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Land Gini 0.843*** 0.690***
(0.120) (0.112)
Tenant farm share 0.606*** 0.561***
(0.036) (0.042)
Terminated lease share 1.362*** 1.077***
(0.154) (0.145)
Daily wage -0.099*** -0.076***
(0.019) (0.018)
Conley SE 0.179 0.131 0.058 0.062 0.239 0.198 0.026 0.018
N 372 372 372 372 361 361 352 352
R2 0.380 0.504 0.600 0.632 0.410 0.515 0.363 0.482
Outcome mean 0.412 0.412 0.412 0.412 0.405 0.405 0.416 0.416
Controls
County FE
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Conley standard errors allow for spatial autocorrelation
among municipalities that are within 50 kilometers of each other. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%,

















































































































































































Panel D: Insurgency and SDP vote share
Figure D1. Event-study estimates: SDP vote share.
Notes: The dependent variable is the Social Democratic Party vote share. The figures plot the
raw differences from an event-study specification and their 95% confidence intervals that are
constructed using standard errors clustered at the municipality level. We use 1917 as the base
year. The vertical line marks the civil war year. All regressions control for municipality fixed




















































































































































































Panel D: Insurgency and turnout
Figure D2. Event-study estimates: voter turnout.
Notes: The dependnet variable is voter turnout. The figures plot the raw differences from an event-
study specification and their 95% confidence intervals that are constructed using standard errors
clustered at the municipality level. We use 1917 as the base year. The vertical line marks the
civil war year. All regressions control for municipality fixed effects, county-year fixed effects, and
baseline controls interacted with year dummies.
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D.2 Regression Results on Workers’ Associations
We complement our analysis on workers’ associations and their membership rates by showing that
workers’ association membership is positively associated with land inequality and labor coercion
(Table D2). However, one exception to this is daily wage (columns 7 and 8) which does not seem
to be correlated with the membership rate. Note also that some of the independent variables are
measured after the dependent variable. Tables D3 and D4 show that we obtain qualitatively similar
results if we look at the presence of local workers’ associations.
Table D2. Land inequality, labor coercion, and workers’ association membership in 1906.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Land Gini 0.267*** 0.242***
(0.046) (0.047)
Tenant farm share 0.070*** 0.086***
(0.015) (0.019)
Terminated lease share 0.272*** 0.251***
(0.065) (0.072)
Daily wage 0.000 -0.004
(0.006) (0.006)
Conley SE 0.056 0.050 0.021 0.025 0.087 0.091 0.008 0.005
N 410 410 410 410 397 397 390 390
R2 0.250 0.277 0.206 0.258 0.213 0.241 0.156 0.209
Outcome mean 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.053 0.053 0.057 0.057
Baseline controls
County FE
Notes: The dependent variable is the population share of workers’ association members. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. Conley standard errors allow for spatial autocorrelation among municipalities that
are within 50 kilometers of each other. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
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Table D3. Famine, inequality, and workers’ associations in 1906.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Famine deaths per capita 1.260*** 0.874*
(0.443) (0.448)
Crop failure 0.043 0.025
(0.045) (0.045)
Income Gini 1.152*** 0.999***
(0.214) (0.215)
Conley SE 0.599 0.533 0.047 0.045 0.255 0.264
N 404 404 324 324 415 415
R2 0.301 0.331 0.222 0.256 0.330 0.353
Outcome mean 0.738 0.738 0.815 0.815 0.740 0.740
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for a municipality having a local workers’
association. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Conley standard errors
allow for spatial autocorrelation among municipalities that are within 50 kilometers of
each other. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
Table D4. Land inequality, labor coercion, and workers’ associations in 1906.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Land Gini 1.044*** 1.008***
(0.227) (0.225)
Tenant farm share 0.560*** 0.596***
(0.098) (0.104)
Terminated lease share 1.000*** 0.848***
(0.273) (0.264)
Daily wage -0.099*** -0.098***
(0.035) (0.036)
Conley SE 0.259 0.221 0.137 0.146 0.279 0.231 0.045 0.045
N 410 410 410 410 397 397 390 390
R2 0.326 0.357 0.358 0.381 0.314 0.340 0.309 0.342
Outcome mean 0.737 0.737 0.737 0.737 0.730 0.730 0.754 0.754
Baseline controls
County FE
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for a municipality having a local workers’ association Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. Conley standard errors allow for spatial autocorrelation among municipalities that are
within 50 kilometers of each other. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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D.3 Regression Results on Strikes
In this section, we complement our analyses on the relationship between the famine, inequality,
labor coercion, and strikes. We first look at the correlation between land inequality and labor
coercion, and agricultural workers’ strikes in Table D5. We see that land inequality and labor
coercion correlate with strike activity as we would expect, although the regression results are
mostly not statistically significant. Table D6 then shows the estimation results using the
occurrence of agricultural workers’ strikes as a dependent variable. The regression results do not
suggest that there was a clear relationship between the famine and strike activity in 1917.
However, there appears to be a positive correlation between economic inequality and strikes. The
results on land inequality and labor coercion, and agricultural workers’ strikes are reported in
Table D6, and they are largely in line with our other results.
We have also reproced all the analyses using data on all strikes that occurred in 1917. First,
Table D8 presents results that correspond to Panel C in Table 8. Second, we examine the correlation
between strike days per capita and land inequality and labor coercion in Table D9. We see that there
were more strike days per capita in locations that had higher land inequality, that had more tenant
farmers, where more leases were terminated, or where wages were lower. While many of the
regression coefficients reported in the table are not statistically significant, they always have the
expected sign. Third, Tables D10 and D11 then look at an alternative outcome: the mere occurrence
of a strike in a given municipality. Table D10 suggests that there is no clear relationship between
the famine and strikes happening during the year 1917. However, columns (5) and (6) show a clear
positive relationship between strike occurrence and economic inequality. This notion is mostly
strengthened by the results that we report in Table D11. Strikes were more likely to happen in
locations with a higher land inequality, more tenant famers, and more terminated tenant famer
leases. However, the regression results for daily wages go to the opposite direction than what we
would have expected.
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Table D5. Land inequality, labor coercion, and agricultural workers’ strike days per capita in
1917.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Land Gini 0.889 1.171
(0.628) (1.125)
Tenant farm share 0.754** 1.148*
(0.359) (0.662)
Terminated lease share 0.065 0.574
(0.800) (0.429)
Daily wage -0.140 -0.144
(0.155) (0.139)
Conley SE 0.631 1.098 0.314 0.513 0.792 0.346 0.140 0.126
N 410 410 410 410 397 397 390 390
R2 0.013 0.029 0.022 0.043 0.010 0.026 0.014 0.027
Outcome mean 0.160 0.160 0.160 0.160 0.141 0.141 0.168 0.168
Baseline controls
County FE
Notes: The dependent variable is agricultural workers’ strike days per capita. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. Conley standard errors allow for spatial autocorrelation among
municipalities that are within 50 kilometers of each other. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance
at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table D6. Famine, inequality, and agricultural workers’ strikes in 1917.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Famine deaths per capita 0.477 0.210
(0.360) (0.383)
Crop failure -0.001 0.001
(0.039) (0.042)
Income Gini 0.436** 0.308*
(0.175) (0.176)
Conley SE 0.325 0.342 0.052 0.052 0.160 0.166
N 404 404 324 324 415 415
R2 0.074 0.117 0.066 0.098 0.083 0.123
Outcome mean 0.114 0.114 0.117 0.117 0.111 0.111
Baseline controls
County FE
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for a local agricultural workers’ strike.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Conley standard errors allow
for spatial autocorrelation among municipalities that are within 50 kilometers of
each other. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
Table D7. Land inequality, labor coercion, and agricultural workers’ strike days per capita in
1917.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Famine deaths per capita 0.268 -0.009
(0.331) (0.361)
Crop failure -0.026 -0.027
(0.036) (0.039)
Income Gini 0.381** 0.251
(0.170) (0.168)
Conley SE 0.296 0.381 0.042 0.040 0.173 0.179
N 409 409 328 328 420 420
R2 0.065 0.106 0.053 0.083 0.075 0.112
Outcome mean 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104
Baseline controls
County FE
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for a local strike. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. Conley standard errors allow for spatial
autocorrelation among municipalities that are within 50 kilometers of each other.
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table D8. Famine, inequality, and strike days per capita in 1917.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Famine deaths per capita 2.160* 2.169*
(1.212) (1.297)
Crop failure 0.218 0.228
(0.255) (0.224)
Income Gini 1.144*** 1.330**
(0.442) (0.661)
Conley SE 0.720 1.040 0.243 0.203 0.420 0.596
N 409 409 328 328 420 420
R2 0.020 0.033 0.015 0.032 0.016 0.032
Outcome mean 0.242 0.242 0.274 0.274 0.254 0.254
Baseline controls
County FE
Notes: The dependent variable is strike days per capita. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. Conley standard errors allow for spatial autocorrelation
among municipalities that are within 50 kilometers of each other. ***, ** and * denote
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Table D9. Land inequality, labor coercion, and strike days per capita in 1917.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Land Gini 1.276** 1.571
(0.642) (1.134)
Tenant farm share 0.600 1.120*
(0.370) (0.668)
Terminated lease share 0.345 0.971*
(0.904) (0.550)
Daily wage -0.099 -0.140
(0.158) (0.142)
Conley SE 0.667 1.138 0.323 0.522 0.987 0.504 0.145 0.130
N 414 414 414 414 401 401 393 393
R2 0.016 0.032 0.019 0.042 0.012 0.029 0.013 0.028
Outcome mean 0.256 0.256 0.256 0.256 0.239 0.239 0.269 0.269
Baseline controls
County FE
Notes: The dependent variable is strike days per capita. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Conley standard errors allow for spatial autocorrelation among municipalities that are
within 50 kilometers of each other. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively.
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Table D10. Famine, inequality, and strikes in 1917.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Famine deaths per capita 1.046** 0.500
(0.505) (0.519)
Crop failure -0.006 -0.021
(0.059) (0.059)
Income Gini 1.044*** 0.858***
(0.260) (0.277)
Conley SE 0.397 0.326 0.074 0.063 0.227 0.220
First stage F 409 409 328 328 420 420
N 0.094 0.181 0.079 0.182 0.120 0.202
R2 0.298 0.298 0.323 0.323 0.300 0.300
Outcome mean
Baseline controls
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for a local strike. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. Conley standard errors allow for spatial autocorrelation
among municipalities that are within 50 kilometers of each other. ***, ** and * denote
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Table D11. Land inequality, labor coercion, and strikes in 1917.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Land Gini 0.997*** 0.606**
(0.291) (0.307)
Tenant farm share 0.127 0.112
(0.109) (0.123)
Terminated lease share 1.213*** 0.922**
(0.429) (0.428)
Daily wage 0.107** 0.090**
(0.043) (0.045)
Conley SE 0.335 0.331 0.128 0.144 0.422 0.442 0.041 0.037
N 414 414 414 414 401 401 393 393
R2 0.113 0.197 0.090 0.190 0.116 0.205 0.095 0.190
Outcome mean 0.295 0.295 0.295 0.295 0.289 0.289 0.310 0.310
Baseline controls
County FE
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for a local strike. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Conley standard errors allow for spatial autocorrelation among municipalities that are within 50
kilometers of each other. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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D.4 Regression Results on Famine and Emigration
While weather shocks and famines in other parts of Europe catalyzed emigration, we do not find
any evidence that more people would have emigrated from Finnish municipalities that were more
exposed to the famine (Table D12). To investigate this possibility, we use annual emigration
statistics to measure the number of emigrants from each municipality between the years 1893 and
1914. While the regression coefficients are positive throughout the table, they are small in
magnitude. The regression coefficients only show hints of statistical significance when we include
county fixed effects in column 2. The coefficients of the crop failure indicator are not statistically
significant. Thus, we find it unlikely that the famine would have induced a massive flow of
emigration which in turn could have induced an increase in workers’ bargaining power.
Table D12. Famine and emigration.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Famine deaths per capita 0.064 0.124**
(0.073) (0.060)
Crop failure 0.006 0.005
(0.009) (0.007)
Conley SE 0.111 0.072 0.010 0.008
N 401 401 323 323
R2 0.576 0.732 0.598 0.725
Outcome mean 0.089 0.089 0.080 0.080
Controls
County FE
Notes: The dependent variable is the emigration rate. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Conley standard
errors allow for spatial autocorrelation among municipalities
that are within 50 kilometers of each other. ***, ** and * denote
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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D.5 Figures and Tables on Industrialization
To demonstrate that Finland was largely an agrarian society still in the early 1900s, Figure D3
shows the share of workers across main sectors and the share of value added by sector over time.
It demonstrates two key features of the Finnish economy. Almost 70 percent of households were
employed in agriculture, and almost half of the value added was genereted in the agricultural
sector. The rise in manufacturing was modest before the Civil War. Thus, if industrialization was
the driver of the income inequality, it should have had a massive impact on the economy very early
on in the industrialization process.
We also do not find any evidence that the famine would have been associated with
industrialization in Finland. Table D13 looks at the share of population employed in
manufacturing after the famine, and Table D14 examines manufacturing growth between the
years 1880 and 1910. The regression coefficients are small and statistically insignificant
throughout the table. Thus, it is unlikely that industrialization would be driving our results in the
way that in Kuznets argued. This could have been the case, for instance, if the famine would have
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Figure D3. Structure of the Finnish economy, 1860-1960.
Table D13. Famine and manufacturing employment in 1880.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Famine deaths per capita -0.045 -0.056
(0.044) (0.046)
Crop failure 0.000 -0.000
(0.005) (0.005)
Conley SE 0.055 0.048 0.006 0.005
N 326 326 275 275
R2 0.158 0.194 0.176 0.219
Outcome mean 0.041 0.041 0.042 0.042
Controls
County FE
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of population
employed in manufacturing. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. Conley standard errors allow for
spatial autocorrelation among municipalities that are within
50 kilometers of each other. ***, ** and * denote statistical
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table D14. Famine and manufacturing growth, 1880-1910.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Famine deaths per capita -0.063 0.012
(0.075) (0.083)
Crop failure -0.009 -0.002
(0.008) (0.008)
Conley SE 0.087 0.100 0.008 0.008
N 326 326 275 275
R2 0.023 0.081 0.026 0.101
Outcome mean 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026
Controls
County FE
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the share
of population employed in manufacturing between the years
1880-1910. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Conley standard errors allow for spatial autocorrelation among
municipalities that are within 50 kilometers of each other. ***,
** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively.
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